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ABSTRACT  
 
Top Management Team Personal Wealth, Within-Team Diversity and the Implications 
for Firm-Level Risk Taking. (May 2012) 
Joanna Tochman Campbell, B.S., Arizona State University 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
       Dr. David G. Sirmon 
 
     
 The manager’s personal wealth is one of the central building blocks of agency 
theory, which considers wealth to be an especially important source of individual utility. 
The managers’ financial position, or the portion of their financial well-being that is not 
dependent on the firm, is also introduced in the original formulation of upper echelons 
theory. However, despite the importance of executive personal wealth to both theories, it 
is rarely mentioned, and even more scarcely studied. My research builds on and extends 
agency and upper echelons theories by focusing on executive personal wealth, defined 
here as the portion of executive net worth that is not attached to current employment at 
the firm (i.e., not contingent on current or future earnings). As such, this research 
provides an initial answer to the following research question: how does the average 
personal wealth of the top management team as well as within-team differences in 
wealth influence firm strategic choices with respect to risk?  
 Specifically, I argue that external wealth alters how managers view firm 
decisions regarding risk; thus, I hypothesize that average top management team (TMT) 
wealth is negatively related to firm unrelated diversification, positively related to R&D 
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investments, and positively related to firm risk. Next, I propose that two types of within-
group diversity – TMT wealth diversity and TMT pay dispersion – attenuate the effect of 
average TMT wealth on these firm outcomes. I test my hypotheses on a panel dataset of 
over 700 firms/TMTs from the S&P1500 over 2002–2008 using panel tobit and fixed 
effect models, and conduct multiple robustness checks. Empirical results strongly and 
consistently support the hypothesized main effects of wealth. However, the results 
regarding the moderating effect of within-group diversity are weak, as the majority of 
the moderation hypotheses are not supported. The main conclusion is that wealthier 
TMTs are less risk averse with respect to firm strategic decisions, which manifests in 
greater R&D spending, lower unrelated diversification, and higher overall firm risk. 
Theoretical and empirical implications as well as suggestions for future research are 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since Barnard’s early account of work at the executive level (Barnard, 
1938), corporate elites have continued to fascinate the media, practitioners and scholars 
alike, prompting a reference to “the romance of leadership” (Meindl, Ehrlich, & 
Dukerich, 1985). Two prominent theories have addressed the issues associated with top 
executives and how they manage their organizations – agency theory and upper echelons 
theory. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) emerged from the writings of early 
managerialists (Berle & Means, 1932), and is primarily concerned with the implications 
of the agency relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989) – the delegation of decision rights from 
owners to professional managers. According to agency theorists, this separation of 
ownership and control in modern day corporations leads to the fundamental agency 
problem (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007) – the misalignment of interests between 
owners and managers, which can lead executives to pursue their own private interests at 
the owners’ (shareholders’) expense. In other words, the agency problem arises because 
owners’ and managers’ goals conflict and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor 
managerial work, because it is too difficult or expensive to do so (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Upper echelons theory, while also primarily focused on the corporate elite, has a 
different but complementary focus; it proposes that executives act based on personalized 
interpretations of the strategic situations they face, and as a result organizations become  
____________ 
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reflections of their top management teams, or the upper echelon of the organization 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to this theory, top managers’ 
characteristics influence the firm’s strategic choices, such as innovation, capital 
intensity, unrelated diversification, and financial leverage (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Since its inception, the upper echelons perspective has spurred numerous studies 
centered around top management team composition, top executives and their impact on 
organizations (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004, for a review). 
 While both theories have generated important insights about the impact of top-
level managers on firm outcomes, agency theory has been the primary theoretical lens 
utilized by corporate governance scholars, and research building on it has greatly 
enhanced our understanding of the issues surrounding the incentivizing and monitoring 
of the corporate leaders. However, accumulated evidence suggests that our 
understanding of the complex relationship among owners, top managers and firm-level 
outcomes is incomplete. Specifically, the theory proposes a number of alignment or 
policing mechanisms aimed at reducing the residual loss to firm value due to managerial 
opportunism. Yet, a recent review concludes that the empirical evidence regarding the 
efficacy of the three main agency problem mitigation mechanisms – board 
independence, equity ownership, and the market for corporate control – offers little 
support for their effectiveness (Dalton et al., 2007), thereby posing questions about the 
comprehensiveness of the current conceptualization of agency theory. Perhaps the 
biggest criticism of agency theory can be leveled based on findings from the stream of 
research concerned with executive compensation. In theory, effective compensation 
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packages help to align executive interests with those of shareholders, thereby prompting 
the maximization of firm performance. However, despite numerous attempts, executive 
compensation research to date has been unable to uncover a systematic pay-performance 
relationship; researchers have reported negative, weakly positive, and non-significant 
results (see Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009, for a review). Exemplifying 
disenchantment with this theoretical lens by a number of scholars, Ghoshal (2005) 
proposed that teaching and issuing recommendations focused on agency theory may in 
fact lead to the very behaviors they are aimed at preventing.  
In contrast to research in the stream of agency theory, which tends to overlook 
personal differences between executives (Hambrick, 2007), upper echelons research 
focuses on these differences and their implications for firm-level outcomes. In fact, the 
theories are complementary and are uniquely suited for integration; building on the 
commonalities between the two can help generate unique insights and answer recent 
calls to generate research combining multiple perspectives (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011). 
Despite a significant amount of research in both the agency theory and upper echelons 
theory traditions, one individual characteristic‒‒executive personal wealth‒‒has not 
been addressed despite its importance to both theories’ predictions. Executive wealth is 
highlighted in the original conceptualization of upper echelons theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984): “financial position” of the “upper echelon” is proposed, alongside age 
and formal education, as one observable managerial characteristic that can influence 
executive preferences. However, the issue of executive wealth has not been addressed 
further by upper echelons researchers. Executive personal wealth also plays an important 
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role in the original formulation of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), where it is 
assumed that all of the manager’s personal wealth is tied to the firm he or she manages 
in the form of equity ownership. In other words, external (non-firm) personal wealth is 
held constant at zero; however, Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognize that because of 
the benefits of diversification and managers’ desire to avoid risk, in reality, managers 
will not hold all their equity in one firm. Thus, external managerial wealth is introduced 
in both agency and upper echelon models, and this linkage presents an opportunity to 
integrate these two theories centered on top managers at the construct level.  
I propose that agency theory could greatly benefit from scholarly consideration 
of differences in personal wealth between executives, which could affect managerial risk 
preferences and the agency problem. Moreover, the consideration of top management 
team (TMT) personal wealth and the differences in wealth within a TMT extends upper 
echelons theory and our understanding of team dynamics by further developing a 
previously unexamined construct. Specifically, I focus on executive personal wealth 
defined as the portion of executive net worth that is not attached to current employment 
at the firm (i.e., not contingent on current or future earnings). As Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992: 35) note, in “many economic decisions, the choice actually made depends on the 
decision maker’s wealth.” Choices made by top managers, and the impact of those 
choices on firm outcomes (such as firm risk and performance), lie at the core of the field 
of strategic management (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007). Thus, the goal of this research 
is to take the first step toward answering the question: how do  executives with more 
personal (external) wealth differ from their less wealthy counterparts in terms of their 
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preferences, and what implications do these differences have for top management team 
dynamics and for the firms they manage? More specifically, how does average external 
wealth of the top management team (upper echelon) as well as within-team differences 
in wealth influence firm strategic choices with respect to risk, and what are the 
implications for the agency problem? 
 For the most part, upper echelons theory and agency theory research have 
developed along separate lines, although researchers have jointly considered executive 
functional background and the position occupied in the organization (Jensen & Zajac, 
2004). Despite the fact that executives’ personal wealth is important to both theories, its 
implications for the agency theory’s predictions, as well as the influence of wealth and 
its distribution within a TMT on decision-making by the upper echelon, remain to be 
examined. As some scholars noted, “the formal analysis of problems in the economics of 
organizations is greatly simplified” when wealth effects are disregarded (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992: 35). This simplification, and the lack of readily available data, has 
perhaps contributed to the absence of attention given to the issue of executive wealth. 
However, the consideration of executive personal wealth introduces important 
contingencies to agency theory’s predictions. Moreover, fully developing the construct 
of executives’ personal wealth at the top management team level and its implications for 
executives’ preferences allows us to better understand the causal mechanisms behind 
executives’ decision-making, thereby extending upper echelons theory. I elaborate on 
these extensions below. 
 The three main agency theory assumptions with respect to human nature‒‒and 
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managerial behavior specifically‒‒include bounded rationality, (firm value-destroying) 
self-interest, and uniform risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989). Introducing differences in 
executive wealth allows for relaxing the third assumption. First, individual personal 
wealth is important to an executive’s willingness to bear firm-specific risk. As Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia point out, “agency theory's contribution to corporate governance has 
been limited by its simplistic assumptions of consistent risk aversion among agents 
(1998: 134).” Specifically, at the core of the theory lies the assumption that managers are 
significantly more risk averse with respect to firm investments than are shareholders 
because the majority of executives’ financial capital is tied to the firms they manage, and 
they are unable to diversify away that risk. This risk misalignment‒‒between risk-
neutral shareholders and risk-averse managers‒‒is one of the fundamental agency issues 
that governance mechanisms seek to remedy. In fact, an entire stream of agency theory 
research, the so-called normative principal-agent literature, addresses the optimal design 
of compensation contracts and their risk-sharing properties with the goal of mitigating 
executives’ risk aversion (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
 However, wealth effects introduce an important contingency to the model. 
Executives with high personal wealth are able to diversify their financial capital that is 
independent of the firm via various investment strategies, thus diluting the impact of 
firm-specific risk, and thereby potentially altering the risk alignment between managers 
and firm owners. TMTs with greater personal (external) wealth should be willing to bear 
more firm-specific risk than TMTs with a greater proportion of their financial well-being 
tied to the firm they manage, because the impact of downside risk posed by their 
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employment on their total wealth position is smaller. This consideration has important 
theoretical implications as it addresses one of the major assumptions of agency theory. 
And given the changes in the 21
st
 century business landscape, such as increasing 
technological intensity in many industries, which requires top managers to make 
concerted efforts to invest in R&D and develop their firms’ technological capabilities, an 
inherently risky endeavor, it also has important practical implications.  
Second, building on the upper echelons theory allows me to address the second 
major assumption of agency theory – value-destroying self-interest – and homogeneous 
interest misalignment between shareholders and managers. In agency theory, managerial 
and executive self-interests diverge, as managers will seek to minimize risk and expend 
effort up to the point where their benefits (as a fraction of the benefit to the firm) equals 
their costs. In other words, managers stop expending effort before firm value reaches the 
maximum level, while shareholders’ primary goal is firm value maximization. However, 
the consideration of wealth effects introduces another important contingency into the 
model. Specifically, as executive personal wealth increases, the marginal utility of an 
additional dollar decreases; thus, as the executive comes closer to achieving financial 
security, other motivators are likely to become more important and influence executive 
cognitions, such as concerns over reputation. 
Third, considering TMT personal wealth extends upper echelons theory by 
examining an important causal mechanism behind TMTs’ attitudes toward risk-taking 
with respect to the firm. The construct of personal wealth was briefly introduced by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), but unlike the other TMT characteristics introduced 
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therein, has not been theoretically or empirically examined since. Importantly, 
examining this construct at the team as opposed to individual level allows for full 
consideration of different types of within-team diversity and their implications for TMT 
dynamics. In this study, I integrate theory on different types of within-group diversity – 
diversity as separation and disparity (Harrison & Klein, 2007). I propose that wealth 
diversity or differences in wealth within a top management team represent separation: 
differences along a continuum on the dimension of personal wealth. Further, I propose 
that diversity in pay or top management pay dispersion represents disparity: within 
teams, executives differ “in the extent to which they hold or receive a share, amount, or 
proportion” of a socially-valued good – firm allocated executive pay (Harrison & Klein, 
2007: 1206). I then argue that these two types of diversity introduce important 
contingencies to the model and reduce/diminish the effect of executive personal wealth 
on the proposed firm outcomes. This study is the first to examine differences in personal 
wealth between executive team members, and as such the first to examine the effects of 
wealth and pay in tandem. 
 Therefore, integrating agency and upper echelons theories through the construct 
of executive personal wealth contributes to and extends both theories. It allows me to re-
examine two major assumptions of agency theory – risk misalignment and interest 
misalignment – by introducing an important confounding influence, TMT personal 
wealth. It also extends upper echelons theory by examining an important mechanism 
behind team decision-making with regard to firm risk, and considering the influence of 
different types of diversity on the decision and interpersonal dynamics within the team. 
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As such, integrating insights from these two perspectives, this study theoretically and 
empirically investigates the impact of TMT personal wealth on strategic decisions taken 
by top managers and on firm outcomes related to risk. Specifically, I develop several 
hypotheses regarding the impact of TMT average wealth on strategic decisions related to 
risk, including R&D investment and diversification, as well as the overall risk of the 
firm. I also introduce and evaluate the impact of different types of within-team diversity 
as moderators to the primary relationships. I then test my theory with a longitudinal 
dataset, which includes estimated TMT external wealth. The theory and the results 
enrich our understanding of wealth effects (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), extend agency 
and upper echelons theories, and contribute to the literature on corporate governance. 
More specifically, this study makes four contributions to the literature.  
First, this study makes a number of important theoretical contributions. I extend 
agency theory by introducing the construct of executives’ external (personal) wealth and 
considering the relevance of TMT external wealth for the predictions derived from 
agency theory. Specifically, I introduce an important intervening factor to the 
fundamental agency problem, which influences risk misalignment. By re-examining the 
core assumptions and investigating contingencies in the agency model, we can develop a 
more realistic and, perhaps, more useful theoretical model to explain executive decision-
making. Integrating insights from upper echelons theory is also consistent with 
Eisenhardt’s (1989: 71) call to “use agency theory with complementary theories,” and 
fills the “pressing” need “to develop theoretical perspectives combining multiple lenses” 
(Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011: 6). Examining executives’ personal wealth using an 
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integration of upper echelon theory and agency theory allows for delineating the causal 
mechanisms in the agency model, answering the question of when, but more importantly 
how executives as agents can achieve closer alignment with firm owners through greater 
financial security and ability to diversify firm risk.   
 I also extend upper echelons theory by fully developing a construct that was 
briefly introduced in early work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), but has not been fully 
theoretically developed or empirically examined since. Moreover, I build on this concept 
to address TMT wealth diversity (i.e., diversity in accumulated personal wealth within a 
top management team) – and examine its implications for TMT agreement regarding 
risk-oriented strategic decisions. As such, I introduce a novel type of diversity to the 
study of corporate elites, and team dynamics in general. In addition, I examine the 
implications of TMT pay dispersion for one of the upper echelons’ core constructs, TMT 
behavioral integration. By theoretically examining two unique types of diversity (wealth 
and pay dispersion) and accounting for TMT heterogeneity, this study adds richness to 
the theoretical treatment of within-group diversity, and allows for a more complete 
empirical investigation. In doing so, it opens new avenues for future research on 
contingencies in the effects of TMT characteristics on firm-level outcomes.     
Second, this study offers a methodological contribution by developing a novel 
model to proxy for executive wealth based on publicly available data, which can be used 
in future empirical studies. Obtaining information about executives’ wealth is extremely 
difficult due to issues of privacy, and direct public disclosure of such information may 
never be feasible (Core & Guay, 2010). Thus, this study provides an opportunity for 
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future research on the implications of executive personal wealth for firm-level strategic 
decisions and outcomes. 
Third, the empirical results offer a number of implications for corporate 
governance practices and can contribute to the public discourse on executive pay. The 
results enrich our understanding of how top-level executive external wealth can affect 
firm outcomes, and just as importantly, can inform our understanding of the influence of 
incentives received from compensation. Core and Guay (2010) propose that boards of 
directors should consider (privately disclosed) information regarding executive wealth 
when structuring performance-based incentives; this research provides additional 
information that boards would have at their disposal when making such decisions. 
Finally, my results have the potential to inform other streams of literature within 
the field of strategic management, including top management team dynamics and their 
influence on firm-level outcomes, the management of innovation, corporate 
diversification, and executive compensation. The novelty of the executive personal 
wealth construct offers multiple opportunities for future research in management and 
related social science disciplines. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
  
Agency Theory 
 Concern about the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and 
control of an enterprise dates back to the 18
th
 century. Adam Smith wrote about 
managers of “joint-stock” companies, “being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own” (Smith, 1776: V.1.107). More recently, early managerialists 
emphasized the consequences and potential hazards of a growing dispersion of 
ownership in modern corporations. According to Berle and Means (1932: 244), through 
a shift of control from the hands of stockholders to the separate group of corporate 
officers, “the shareholder in the modern corporation has surrendered a set of definite 
rights for a set of indefinite expectations.” As such, “the stockholder is left as a matter of 
law with little more than the loose expectation that a group of men, under a nominal duty 
to run the enterprise for his benefit and that of others like him, will actually observe the 
obligation” (Berle & Means, 1932: 244). Modern agency theory began to emerge from 
these roots in the late 1970s (Lim, Das, & Das, 2009).  
 Simply put, the agency problem arises because owners’ and managers’ goals and 
desires likely conflict and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor managerial work, 
because it is too difficult or expensive to do so (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Jones, 
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“Whether we like it or not, people’s personal goals play a dominant role in company 
decision-making. When a man is making company decisions (…), he examines them in 
part with a view to whether they will further his own goals” (1957: 89). The set of 
potential detrimental behaviors on the part of managers as a result of the principal-agent 
relationship includes suboptimal effort, perquisite consumption and the pursuit of “pet 
projects,” and under/overinvestment (Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 2004), as well as 
pursuing higher than optimal salary (Boyd, 1994), unrelated diversification to reduce 
personal exposure to risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981), and empire-building (Jensen, 1986), 
among others.
1
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided a formal derivation of agency 
costs, building on the literature on the firm and property rights (Coase, 1937; Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). These costs, which are a direct result of the agency problem (i.e., the 
separation of ownership and control), include the monitoring expenditures on the part of 
the owner/principal (such as the costs of monitoring, compensation to the 
manager/agent, etc.), the bonding costs incurred by the agents – or the cost to the 
managers of expending resources to guarantee to the principals that they will not take 
actions against them, and the residual loss to firm value as a result of the agency conflict. 
Agency costs can also be viewed as the difference in payoffs to the owners when their 
interests and those of management are perfectly aligned versus when they are not (Lim, 
Das, & Das, 2009).  
There are three primary mechanisms aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of 
the agency conflict on firm performance, and by extension, firm value: the market for 
                                                          
1
 See Hendry (2002) for a treatment of incompetence as an agency cost. 
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corporate control, board monitoring, and incentive alignment through executive 
compensation. Specifically, the market for corporate control represents an external 
policing mechanism, while monitoring by a board of directors and providing appropriate 
incentives to managers through pay and its various components are the two main internal 
control mechanisms. Monitoring is a lower cost mechanism for replacing or disciplining 
managers than an outside takeover (Fama, 1980); thus, the market for corporate control 
only intervenes when the two abovementioned internal mechanisms fail.  
Manne (1965) was the first to elaborate on the market for corporate control as a 
corporate governance mechanism. According to the argument, the firm’s stock price is 
an objective standard of managerial efficiency; as such, the stock price of companies that 
are poorly managed will decline relative to the industry or market as a whole, which will 
facilitate a takeover by a more efficient group of managers. This threat of takeover 
“provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers” 
(Manne, 1965: 113). The market for corporate control was extremely active in the 1980s, 
when corporate takeovers and takeover attempts were taking place at an unprecedented 
rate. According to Davis (1990: 584), due to a confluence of factors, “the 1980s have 
been the decade of a large takeover.” Of the 1980 Fortune 500 companies, over one 
quarter were acquired by the end of 1989, and many of the transactions were hostile 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1991).  
However, because of widespread adoption of various antitakeover provisions in 
response, which involved a change in corporate charter or operating policy to make a 
takeover more expensive (Sundaramurthy, 2000), this option became increasingly 
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unattractive to potential acquirers. Moreover, the market for corporate control suffered 
heavy criticism both in the 1980s and shortly thereafter, such as they provided a 
redistribution of wealth rather than creation of new wealth. Additionally, it was 
criticized for creating a second set of agency costs by “corporate raiders,” and 
substantial negative spillovers for other stakeholder groups, including the employees of 
acquired firms (Dalton et al., 2007). These reasons contributed to the demise of the 
market for corporate control, which began in the late 1980s. This, combined with the 
paucity of empirical evidence to suggest that the majority of companies targeted by 
corporate raiders were performing poorly or exhibited significant agency problems―in 
fact, many of them outperformed the market (Walsh & Kosnik, 1993), resulted in the 
effective disappearance of the market for corporate control in recent years (Dalton et al., 
2007). The scholarship on the subject shared a similar fate, and it would be hard to argue 
that the threat of a takeover is an effective means for disciplining top management today. 
 The market for corporate control can be viewed as a very distal mechanism, 
which may not be salient to executives on an everyday basis. Monitoring by a board of 
directors, however, is a more proximal mechanism for ensuring the appropriate (i.e., 
shareholder wealth-maximizing) behavior of agents. Directors have a fiduciary 
responsibility to the firm’s shareholders, and are charged with acting in their best 
interests through their role in advising, monitoring, and disciplining management. Board 
independence, or the degree to which the board is free from the influence of the firm’s 
management, is considered key to efficient board monitoring (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003). Outside directors are considered to be better monitors, because they are 
16 
 
 
 
not beholden to the current CEO, even though inside directors may have an incentive to 
monitor/discipline the CEO with the hope of replacing him or her in case of negligence 
or poor performance (Fama, 1980).  
 However, extant empirical research fails to support the idea that board 
composition is an important determinant of governance quality. For example, 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) found that outside directors who are also shareholders may 
facilitate concealment of negative firm outcomes in annual reports for private gain. Certo 
and colleagues (2008) found that outside directors received greater pay following 
acquisitions by the firm, suggesting that they may approve firm expansion for personal 
gain. Moreover, a stream of research by Westphal and colleagues suggests that corporate 
boards are subject to various sociopolitical influences, including social distancing 
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003), director ingratiation (Westphal & Stern, 2007), and 
friendship ties between directors and the CEO (Westphal, 1999), all of which can limit 
the effectiveness of monitoring. A study by Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) points to the 
evidence of cronyism, or the fact that firms with overcompensated CEOs tend to have 
overcompensated directors, which in turn is associated with below average firm 
performance. Also, recent evidence suggests that there is significant variation in the 
board’s allocation of attention to the function of monitoring (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010), and independence alone does not guarantee monitoring effectiveness.  
 Lastly, in theory, more effective monitoring reduces agency costs associated with 
executive shirking and opportunism, and should thus translate to higher firm 
performance. However, an extensive meta-analysis failed to uncover a systematic 
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relationship between board composition, a proxy for board monitoring effectiveness, and 
firm financial performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). In light of the 
accumulated empirical evidence, a recent editorial article deems the literature on board 
composition and firm performance “astonishingly inconclusive” (Dalton & Dalton, 
2011: 406). 
 Adding another level of complexity, a nascent stream of research within the 
broader agency theory literature suggests that directors can be subject to similar agency 
issues as the firm’s management, implying a multiple agency problem (e.g., Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2010). 
Multiple agency theory proposes that directors, regardless of their independence, are 
subject to agency issues parallel to the agency issues related to the firm’s executives. 
Thus, beyond the primary agents, executives (or managerial–agents), the multiple 
agency view recognizes secondary groups of agents, who intervene between 
shareholders and managerial–agents. The most prevalent of such groups is the board of 
directors. As such, this view highlights that the delegation of monitoring duties from the 
owners to the board creates a secondary agency problem, as directors themselves may be 
prone to pursuing their own agendas, and―as research suggests―may be beholden to 
the CEO as opposed to the firm’s shareholders (Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).  
 Given the nascent literature on the topic, empirical studies utilizing a multiple 
agency perspective are scarce. And although corporate directors are the largest and most 
prominent group of secondary agents, the majority of extant work has examined multiple 
agency conflicts in the context of initial public offerings (Allcock & Filatotchev, 2009; 
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Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010). However, studies are beginning to address the 
“dual-agency” problem in the realm boards of directors (i.e., Deutsch, Keil, & 
Laamanen, 2010). 
The final pillar of governance mechanisms, incentive alignment through 
executive compensation, has arguably generated the greatest amount of controversy, 
both in the public and academic domain. In theory, efficient executive compensation 
packages help align managerial interests with those of shareholders, leading them to 
maximize firm value. However, despite the extensive amount of research devoted to 
executive compensation, researchers failed to find support for a systematic pay‒firm 
performance relationship (see Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009, for a review), fueling 
debates regarding the efficiency and legitimacy of executive compensation as a 
governance mechanism (Kaplan, 2008a, 2008b; Walsh, 2008). In fact, stock options, 
widely issued with the intent of aligning the risk propensities of owners and managers, 
have been found to produce several unintended deleterious outcomes in some 
circumstances, including excessive risk-taking and fraud (e.g., Burns & Kedia,  2006; 
Hanouna, & Sarin, 2006; O'Connor Jr. et al., 2006; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Zhang et 
al., 2008). Wowak, Hambrick and Henderson (2011) find some evidence supportive of 
Fama’s (1980) concept of “settling-up,” whereby the board takes into account the history 
of CEO performance when making current pay decisions. However, they also find that 
the CEO’s earlier overpayment is positively, rather than negatively as theory would 
predict, related to the size of the current raise. As such, some scholars argue that 
executive compensation is often driven by managerial power rather than board attempts 
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at interest alignment (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2005). Others highlight the role of executive pay packages as a symbol to internal 
and external stakeholders (Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1998).  
In sum, evidence on the efficacy of the three main governance mechanisms is, at 
best, weak (see Dalton et al., 2007, for a review). The lack of strong support for agency 
theory’s tenets has prompted some to question whether researchers should further rely 
on and provide prescriptions based on agency theory (Ghoshal, 2005). Others, however, 
recognize the utility and promise in combining agency theory with complementary 
theories (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Hambrick, 2007). Redefining agency theory using a 
close area of research, but with different underlying assumptions―such as upper 
echelons theory―speaks to the “pressing” need “to develop theoretical perspectives 
combining multiple lenses” (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011: 6). Both theories acknowledge 
the importance of the upper layer of management for the performance of the entire 
enterprise. However, in contrast to agency theory, which assumes that ex ante all 
executives must we viewed as uniformly self-seeking, the upper echelons perspective 
concentrates on the heterogeneity in executive personal preferences. Despite the appeal 
of combining the two theoretical perspectives, studies introducing the upper echelons 
perspective to the study of corporate governance are rare [for exceptions, see Jensen & 
Zajac (2004); Kor (2006); Kor & Misangyi (2008)]. I introduce the basic tenets of upper 
echelons theory next. 
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Upper Echelons Theory 
 The idea that executive personal characteristics may influence organizational 
outcomes has a much shorter intellectual lineage than agency theory. Its early roots can 
be traced back to Herbert Simon (1957) and the Carnegie Mellon School of thought, 
which, in contrast to the idea of a perfectly rational ‘Economic Man’, portrayed 
individuals as rational beings, but only boundedly so. March and Simon (1958) argued 
that decision-makers bring a set of idiosyncratic ‘givens’ to each situation. In an early 
work, Dauten, Gammill, and Robinson (1958: 41) point out that, “the activities of all 
managers are guided and controlled broadly by such things as personal goals, and 
values,” and even though “such human values seem to defy complete analysis, it is 
sometimes overlooked that they serve as the master control of all organizational 
activity.” According to the authors, such managerial values “control and direct” 
managerial behavior. Early research on executive characteristics, however, concentrated 
on questions such as how the type of industry or the size of the firm correlate with the 
educational background of executives, with an emphasis on sorting effects according to 
organizational needs (e.g., Gaither, 1975; Price, 1972). 
 The empirical beginnings of upper echelons research are preceded by research on 
organizational demography, defined as the “composition, in terms of basic attributes 
such as age, sex, educational level, length of service or residence, race and so forth of a 
social entity under study” (Pfeffer, 1983: 303). In the 1983 review article, Pfeffer 
proposed that demographic variables affect a number of intervening variables and 
processes, which in turn influence organizational outcomes (Pettigrew, 1992). He also 
21 
 
 
 
points out the advantage of using demographic variables in that they are “readily 
measured and reasonably objective,” as opposed to “hypothetical unobservable 
constructs such as commitment” (Pfeffer, 1983: 352; Pettigrew, 1992). Importantly, 
organizational demography “is based on the data gathered on individuals,” such as 
individuals’ age and tenure, “but is, in fact, a collective or unit-level property” (Pfeffer, 
1985; 68). In other words, demography is a property of organizations. 
 In 1984, Hambrick and Mason published their seminal work, which became the 
starting point of the empirical stream of research on the ‘upper echelon’ of 
organizations. In contrast to organizational demography research, which highlighted the 
importance of the demographic make-up of entire organizations (i.e., spanning multiple 
organizational levels), Hambrick and Mason brought the focus to the organization’s top 
level. They argue that characteristics of the upper echelon‒‒executive values and 
preferences‒‒are reflected in organizational outcomes. An important point of the paper 
is that executives matter
2
 – contrary to the belief held by population ecology scholars 
(e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977), and some institutional scholars (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This point would not go uncontested; in fact, some oft cited early studies 
seemed to indicate that executives account for very little variance in organizational 
outcomes (Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). However, recent 
research using large samples and more advanced analysis techniques suggests otherwise 
– in the Unites States, the CEO effect on corporate outcomes seems to be larger than the 
                                                          
2
 A related but separate literature highlights the role and importance of managerial characteristics as 
signals to external constituents, which may in turn influence organizational outcomes, especially at the 
IPO stage of the organization (e.g., Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Zhang 
& Wiersema, 2010). 
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effect of the industry the firm operates in (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Mackey, 
2008).
3
 Moreover, Sirmon, Gove, and Hitt (2008) showed that managerial decisions 
regarding resource bundling and deployment actions have important implications for 
competitive outcomes and sustainable competitive advantage. In related research, 
Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly (2009) showed that managerial ability has significant 
implications for firm performance, and is thus an important source of value creation. 
Together, these findings suggest that executives and their choices matter in terms of 
organizational outcomes. Still, exactly how much the executive matters partly depends 
on how much managerial discretion, or latitude of action, they are afforded (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  
 Among upper echelon characteristics that may influence strategic choices, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) included age, functional experience of executives, 
education, socioeconomic roots, and group heterogeneity. Similar to Pfeffer (1983), 
Hambrick and Mason emphasized the utility of using observable, demographic variables 
as proxies for unobservable constructs such as executive cognitive bases and values. 
While values and preferences are considered important theoretical drivers, the “primary 
emphasis is placed on observable managerial characteristics as indicators of the givens 
that a manager brings to an administrative situation” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 196). 
The reasons they present are manifold, including the extraordinary difficulty in direct 
measurement considering the target group, success of earlier research in using 
demographic variables, and the lack of psychological equivalent for some constructs, 
                                                          
3
 Moreover, untimely departures of CEOs, especially when due to sudden death, are met with a significant 
negative market reaction (Worrell, Davidson, Chandy, & Garrison, 1986). 
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such as executive tenure or functional background.  
 Since the publication of the seminal article, a stream of studies on executive 
characteristics and their impact on organizational outcomes has followed. For example, 
one of the more frequently studied characteristics is executive tenure. Hambrick and 
Fukotomi (1991) presented a theory of executive tenure, where they proposed five 
discernible phases, or “seasons”, each CEO goes through during a period of his or her 
employment. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found that tenure is positively related to 
strategic persistence and strategic conformity. In a related vein, Hambrick et al. (1993) 
found that executive tenure in the industry, even more so than organizational tenure, is 
positively related to the executive commitment to the status quo. Additionally, Miller 
(1991) showed that CEO tenure is negatively related to the optimal match between the 
organization and the environment, which has a detrimental effect on firm performance.  
 In addition to CEO tenure, researchers have examined the effects of executive 
hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), CEO narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Lubit, 2002), CEO charisma (Waldman, Javidan, & Varella, 2004), CEO personality 
(Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010), as well as CEO positive and negative affectivity 
(Delagado-Garcia & de la Fuente-Sabate, 2010). However, in addition to this focus on 
the chief executive, a large portion of upper echelons research examines the effects of 
top management team characteristics on firm-level outcomes. 
 Researchers have examined relationships between TMT composition/demo-
graphic characteristics, such as tenure or functional background, and business 
diversification strategy (Michel & Hambrick, 1992), international diversification 
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(Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000), changes in corporate strategy (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992), strategic planning (Bantel, 1993), managerial turnover (Wagner, Pfeffer, 
& O’Reilly, 1984; Wiersema & Bird, 1993), and innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), 
among others (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004, for a review). A recent 
meta-analysis provided modest evidence of positive relationships between TMT size as 
well as TMT heterogeneity and firm financial performance; however, the authors also 
detected moderating influences on these relationships (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 
2006).  
 While most studies tend to focus on organizational outcomes, some have targeted 
more proximal outcomes; for example, Sutcliffe (1994) examined the effect of 
functional diversity and tenure on executive perceptions of environmental instability and 
environmental munificence. Similarly, Waller, Huber, and Glick (2005) examined the 
effect of executives’ functional backgrounds on their perceptions of changes in the 
organizations’ environments and effectiveness. Moreover, Miller, Burke and Glick 
(1998) found a negative effect of cognitive diversity on decision comprehensiveness and 
extensiveness, while Olson and colleagues (2007) showed a positive effect of cognitive 
diversity on task conflict. Knight and colleagues (1999) showed that different types of 
demographic diversity are mostly negatively related to strategic consensus. Introducing a 
novel construct, Souitaris and Maestro (2010) studied the effect of TMT polychronicity 
(i.e., the degree to which TMT members mutually prefer to multitask) on strategic 
decision speed and comprehensiveness, in addition to new venture performance.  
 Nevertheless, among the plethora of executive team characteristics examined, 
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one construct mentioned by Hambrick and Mason (1984) ‒ the “financial position” of 
the upper echelon ‒ has not been given much research consideration. The financial 
position TMT members enjoy, or the average wealth of the top echelon of the 
organization, remains a relatively unexplored concept. This is perhaps especially 
surprising given the heated academic and public discourse regarding the size of 
executive compensation packages. This debate, however, centers largely on the 
“deservingness” (Cowherd & Levine, 1992), or lack thereof, of such wealth acquisition 
and accumulation. To date, the effects of executive accumulated wealth on individual-
level and firm-level outcomes remain to a large extent unknown to organizational 
researchers. One of the reasons behind this gap is likely the lack of readily available data 
on managers’ external wealth. Obtaining information about executives’ wealth is 
extremely difficult because of privacy issues, and as Core and Guay (2010) note, public 
disclosure of such information may never be possible. Nonetheless, a handful of studies 
incorporate this important construct. I summarize the relevant literature below. 
Executive Wealth 
 The manager’s personal wealth is one of the central building blocks of agency 
theory, as in “the economic view in which agency theory is grounded, personal wealth is 
an especially important source of subjective utility” (McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 
2008: 455). As such, because executives seek to maximize their own utility (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), the desire to increase and protect their financial resources is a key 
motive around which monitoring mechanisms are structured. However, despite the 
central position that executive personal wealth occupies in agency theory, it is rarely 
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mentioned, and even more scarcely studied. Similarly, the upper echelons literature has 
ignored one of the individual characteristics introduced by Hambrick and Mason (1984: 
202), specifically, the managers’ financial position, or the portion of their financial well-
being that is dependent on the firm. As they note, the executive’s objectives may change 
once he or she has substantial income that is not tied up in the focal firm. Hence, the 
importance of executive wealth figures is highlighted in both theories, and enables a 
linkage between the upper echelons theory and agency theory at a construct level.  
 Personal wealth has been studied in the domain of entrepreneurship, in the 
context of firm founders.
4
 For example, Sorensen’s (2007) findings from the Danish 
labor market suggest that windfall gains to personal wealth (i.e., a sudden large increase 
in wealth) are a strong predictor of entry into entrepreneurship (self-employment), which 
is consistent with prior research (e.g., Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996).
5
 Moreover, based on a 
sample of business start-ups in Norway, Hvide and Moen (2010) found that wealth is 
correlated with start-up size, suggesting that wealthy individuals are able to overcome 
liquidity constraints; they also find a curvilinear relationship between founder wealth 
and firm profitability, whereby profitability increases in the first three quartiles of 
wealth, but drops in the top quartile.   
 Only a few studies empirically examined the effects of executive wealth in the 
                                                          
4
 This setting is unique in that 1) the agency problem does not apply to owner-managers (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), and 2) meta-analytic findings point to individual differences between entrepreneurs and 
professional managers (Zhao & Seibert, 2006). Moreover, the majority of such studies have relied on data 
from Scandinavian countries, where strong institutional norms favoring social democracy may affect their 
generalizability. 
5 Interestingly, this finding is contrary to Durkheim’s (1951) theory of anomie in sociology, which 
suggests that sudden wealth has detrimental consequences to individual motivation (Abrahamson, 1980). 
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context of professional managers. May (1995) estimated the proportion of CEO wealth 
that is vested in firm equity, and his findings suggest that it is positively associated with 
diversification based on 226 acquisitions made between 1979 and 1990, which supports 
the executive risk reduction motive. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), based on a 
sample of Canadian executives, found that “success”‒‒measured as a factor of income, 
wealth, position in the firm (top versus lower level), and authority‒‒was positively 
related to some measures of risk taking. Finally, using data from tax filings of Swedish 
CEOs, Becker (2006) found that wealthier CEOs have higher share ownership in the 
company compared to their less wealthy counterparts, which the author interprets as 
“receiving stronger incentives.” While limited in number and scope, these studies 
suggest that executive wealth is an important variable, which can influence decision-
making with regard to risk, acquisition behavior, and potentially a host of other firm-
level decisions and outcomes.  
Theoretical Model 
 My theoretical model is guided by three key insights from extant theory and 
empirical research. First, agency theory highlights the problem of risk sharing (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994), which arises because agents and principals likely have different attitudes 
toward risk, and their risk preferences with respect to the firm’s strategic choices diverge 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, upper echelons theory proposes that top managers’ 
characteristics influence the firm’s strategic choices, such as those related to important 
outcomes including innovation, capital intensity, unrelated diversification, and financial 
leverage (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Finally, as reviewed above, the relatively few 
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studies that examined the effects of wealth indicate that it has important implications for 
the individual’s willingness to take risk (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; May, 1995), 
including taking the personal risk of starting an entrepreneurial venture (Lindh and 
Ohlsson, 1996; Sorensen, 2007). As such, research findings suggest that the wealth of 
top management team members is likely to influence strategic choices related to risk-
taking at the firm-level. Therefore, integrating the theory and empirical research on 
agency theory, upper echelons theory, and personal wealth, I structure a theoretical 
model based on the following proposition: external wealth of the upper echelon 
influences their strategic choices with respect to risk, which has important implications 
for the agency problem. 
 Expanding upon the above stated proposition, I develop a number of hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between executives’ personal (i.e., external) wealth and three 
risk-related firm-level outcomes: unrelated diversification, R&D intensity (i.e., the 
firm’s innovation posture), and the overall risk of the firm. I define executive 
personal/external wealth as the portion of executive net worth that is not attached to 
current employment at the firm (i.e., not contingent on current or future earnings). While 
much of extant research focuses on the CEO as the single most important decision-
maker, expanding the focus to the top management team increases the predictive power 
of both agency and upper echelons theories, as CEOs share tasks and, to a certain 
degree, power with other TMT members (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). To the extent that 
TMT members share in the decision-making process regarding some firm strategy 
choices, and the upper echelon of the organization represents a ‘dominant coalition’ 
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(Cyert & March, 1963), theory should be tested at the team level. Indeed, TMT 
incentives have been shown to matter for firm risk-taking (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & 
Pettus, 2007). Moreover, as Hambrick and Mason note, “the study of an entire team has 
the added advantage of allowing inquiry into dispersion characteristics” (1984: 197). As 
such, I develop theory at the TMT level. 
 The first set of hypotheses holds within-group differences constant and assumes a 
relatively high level of agreement within a TMT on the executive characteristic of 
interest, his or her accumulated personal wealth. As such, where hypotheses wording 
refers to “executives” or “managers”, it pertains to all top managers (as opposed to, for 
example, CEOs alone) and treats them in the aggregate. The second set of hypotheses, 
however, introduces the element of dispersion to the study. Specifically, I later introduce 
and integrate theory on different types of within-group diversity – diversity as 
separation and disparity (Harrison & Klein, 2007) ‒ and argue that they reduce/diminish 
the effect of personal wealth on the proposed outcomes through their impact on (1) TMT 
agreement regarding risk through differences in wealth between members of the same 
executive team (i.e., decision conflict) and on (2) TMT behavioral integration through 
TMT pay dispersion (i.e., relationship conflict). I examine the sources and types of 
diversity that are relevant to my theoretical framework, because as Zellmer-Bruhn et al. 
(2008: 42) note, “it is neither methodologically possible nor theoretically desirable to 
study all possible sources of team diversity in any given study.” An outline of proposed 
relationships is shown in Figure A1.  
 
 
30 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Top Management Team Wealth and Attitudes Toward Risk Taking 
 Investment in innovation. The preferences of shareholders and managers 
regarding firm investment in innovation can diverge, which can result in substantial 
agency costs. R&D investment is considered to be a crucial means for gaining market 
share (Franko, 1989), a necessary prerequisite for creating absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Tsai, 2001), a strong determinant of the firm’s innovation output 
(Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008), and‒‒on a national level‒‒a major determinant of 
domestic productivity growth (Park, 1995). Internal investments in innovation are tied to 
the firm’s long-term survival prospects.  
 However, R&D investments are also inherently risky (Kor, 2006). It often takes 
several years for R&D investments to yield a profit (Lee & O’Neill, 2003), and such 
projects have notoriously high failure rates (e.g., Hill & Snell, 1988; Mansfield, 1968). 
As such, R&D spending has been utilized as a proxy for firm strategic risk (Devers et al., 
2008; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Investment in R&D is a high risk-high return strategy 
that is preferred by shareholders, because they can diversify their personal portfolios; 
managers, on the other hand, unable to diversify away their employment risk, are 
reluctant to invest in long-term R&D projects (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). The 
outcomes of R&D investments are far less predictable than those of possible substitute 
strategies, such as acquisitions (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1990; Hitt, Hoskisson, 
31 
 
 
 
Ireland, & Harrison, 1991). Moreover, as Smith and Tushman (2005: 525) point out, 
“Levinthal and March (1993) suggest that managers are myopic ‒ privileging short term 
over long term, close rather than far, and certainty of success over risk of failure.” As 
such, because of the uncertain and long-term nature of R&D investments, executives 
tend to under-invest in internal innovation prospects, and exhibit preference for less 
risky projects and strategies.  
 However, an important factor to consider is executive personal wealth, which is 
likely to influence the preferences of TMT members regarding R&D investment, and as 
upper echelons theory suggests, these preferences will be reflected in firm actions. All 
else equal, wealthier executives will be relatively less risk averse in terms of firm actions 
compared to their less wealthy counterparts (Becker, 2006). Personal wealth allows them 
greater financial security, and can act as a buffer when R&D projects fail or take a long 
time to provide a financial payoff. Because most innovations take a long-time to 
materialize, the market may become disenchanted with the long-run strategy of 
emphasizing R&D as opposed to more incremental modifications to current, potentially 
still very popular, products. If the stock price suffers as a result, it will affect managerial 
well-being to the extent that his/her wealth is tied up in firm equity. This becomes less of 
a concern for top management team members as their external personal wealth increases. 
As such, having access to substantial personal wealth can extend the executives’ time 
horizon, making R&D investments more attractive. In a similar vein, Hoskisson and 
colleagues (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002) showed that pension fund 
ownership (i.e., ownership by investors with long time horizons) was positively related 
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to internal innovation, measured by R&D intensity and new product intensity.  
 Moreover, executives can use their personal wealth holdings to diversify firm-
specific risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which is likely to increase following 
investments in R&D. Accordingly, wealthy executives that are able to diversify their 
portfolios will be not be deterred by increases in risk. In fact, they may even view their 
focal firm equity as the riskier part of their total portfolio and increase investment in 
risky strategies, such as R&D, to amplify their chances of a large payoff. As Hill and 
Snell (1988: 58) note, “An innovation strategy may be attractive to investors who hold a 
balanced portfolio (…) It is less attractive to managers who have to bear the 
consequences of failure.” In other words, greater external wealth decreases executives’ 
reliance on the firm, and lessens the relative financial consequences of failed innovation 
projects; thus, as the accumulated external wealth of executives increases, they should be 
more willing to purse successful innovation outcomes despite the inherent risk involved.  
 Finally, agency theorists propose that executives maximize a utility function in 
which status, income and financial security play a key role (Hoskisson et al., 2002). As 
executives’ personal wealth increases, the additional utility of a marginal dollar 
decreases – simply put, additional income is not “worth” as much when the executive 
has already amassed personal wealth. It is likely that when the managers are coming 
closer to achieving relative financial security, both current and future income become 
less important compared to managerial status or reputation. This greater emphasis on 
reputation can translate into greater willingness to engage in exploratory activities with 
the aim of discovering what will eventually become the next breakthrough innovation. 
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For example, Apple’s former CEO famously received $1 salary, but prided himself on 
the successful innovations that Apple consistently introduced into the marketplace. 
 In sum, the high risk-high return strategy of pursuing internal innovation through 
R&D investments will be more appealing to top management teams with greater average 
personal wealth of its members. Formally: 
 Hypothesis 1: TMT average personal wealth is positively related to firm 
investment in internal innovation (research-and-development intensity). 
 
 Firm diversification. Managerial motives have important implications for the 
firm’s business diversification. Shareholders can diversify their holdings across a 
number of firms; as such, they are assumed to be risk-neutral with respect to the firm. 
Executives, on the other hand, have significant amounts of human and financial capital 
tied to the firms they manage. Firm officers are, for example, not allowed to short sell 
their firm’s stock to prevent hedging, they are forbidden from exercising or selling their 
stock options within a pre-specified period, and may be required to forfeit profits from 
firm stock-based transactions (Lambert, Larcker, & Verrecchia, 1991); these and other 
factors prevent them from diversifying their holdings in ways that shareholders are able 
to do so. Because the managers’ investments are non-diversifiable (and, in the case of 
human capital, non-tradable), this can cause overexposure to firm-specific risk (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994). As a result of this exposure, managers may be motivated to reduce the 
amount of risk to their personal holdings. One possible way to achieve this is through 
unrelated diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1988). Research shows 
that unrelated diversification is associated with lower returns than related diversification 
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(see Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000, for a review), but also lower risk (e.g., Bettis & 
Mahajan, 1985). Agency theory suggests that managers may be willing to trade-off 
lower efficiency for reduced operating risk (Hill & Snell, 1989). Thus, unrelated 
diversification increases managers’ personal financial well-being at the expense of 
shareholders (Westphal & Graebner, 2010).  
 However, an important managerial characteristic that is likely to influence the 
executives’ willingness to pursue potentially value-reducing diversification is their 
‘financial position’ (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) or personal wealth, which does not 
depend on current or future income, and is thus not tied to the firm. For instance, if firm 
equity represents “a significant proportion of a corporate insider's total wealth, the result 
of such ownership may be an increasingly undiversified personal wealth portfolio” 
(Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996: 442). Indeed, May’s (1995) finding that the 
estimated proportion of CEO wealth that is in the form of firm equity (i.e., tied to the 
firm) is positively associated with diversification through acquisitions is suggestive of 
the idea that executives pursue risk reduction through unrelated diversification. Wealthy 
managers, on the other hand, can use their personal (external) wealth to structure a well-
diversified total wealth portfolio, mitigating the effect of firm-specific risk, thereby 
reducing the motivation for unrelated diversification.  
 In fact, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 349) concede that most managers “hold 
personal wealth in a variety of forms, and some have only a relatively small fraction of 
their wealth invested in the corporation they manage,” and managers can decrease risk 
bearing through personal diversification and optimal portfolio selection. In other words, 
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if executives have a substantial portion of personal, non-firm wealth (i.e., financial 
capital that is not contingent on current or future firm performance), they can use their 
personal wealth holdings to diversify away firm specific risk, similar to the way an 
ordinary shareholder would diversify his or her stock portfolio across multiple holdings. 
Managers can use their personal wealth that is not currently tied to the firm to purchase 
equity in other firms, as well as other financial instruments, such as bonds or shares in 
exchange-traded funds. Hung, Liu and Tsai (2012), using a unique dataset of executives 
from Taiwan, document this managerial risk-reduction motive by showing that managers 
trade in other firms’ equities in order to reduce their exposure to firm-specific risk; 
moreover, the proportion of managerial wealth that is tied up in firm equity is directly 
related to the degree of portfolio diversification. This supports this idea that managers 
“self-select among different equities beyond those of their own firm” (Hung et al., 2012: 
39) using financial capital that is not tied to the focal firm that is available to them. In 
sum, as TMT members’ personal wealth increases, the portion of that wealth that is 
unavoidably exposed to firm-specific risk decreases; as a result, the motivation to pursue 
unrelated diversification should decrease accordingly. Thus: 
 Hypothesis 2: TMT average personal wealth is negatively related to the 
unrelated portion of business diversification. 
 
 Firm risk. Agency theory assumes that agents are risk-averse with respect to firm 
investments (Eisenhardt, 1989), and without proper incentives are thus unwilling to 
undertake an optimal (firm-value maximizing) amount of risk from the standpoint of the 
firm’s shareholders. Specifically, bearing firm specific risk by having their financial and 
36 
 
 
 
human capital tied to the firm may influence managers’ risk propensity; if executives are 
unable to diversify away firm-specific risk (e.g., the majority of their wealth is tied up in 
long-term incentive compensation), they are prone to act in a risk-averse manner and 
decrease risk taking. Research evidence indicates that risk reduction can be detrimental 
to firm value (Low, 2009). However, upper echelons theory suggests that this 
assumption of universal risk aversion can be relaxed, because individuals vary in their 
attitudes toward risk. For example, Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that firms 
with older managers will pursue less risky strategies than firms with younger managers 
at the helm; they suggested three explanations of this managerial behavior: having less 
mental stamina and being less able to learn new behaviors, exhibiting greater 
commitment to the status quo, and financial/career security becoming relatively more 
important as managers want to ensure certain levels of retirement income.
6
 Also, a study 
by Miller and Shamsie (2001) suggests that late in their tenures, top managers reduce 
product line experimentation, which is associated with a decline in the organization’s 
financial performance. 
 The relevance of managerial individual characteristics for firm risk is not limited 
to executives’ age. Personal wealth is another important personal characteristic that may 
influence managers’ willingness to bear overall firm risk. Managers whose wealth is 
largely tied to the firm are likely to act in a risk-averse manner (Gray & Cannella, 1997); 
this is due to their inability to effectively diversify their personal wealth risk (Devers, 
                                                          
6
 Interestingly, the consideration of executives’ accumulated personal wealth introduces an important 
contingency to the third suggested explanation, because as executive age increases, the likelihood that he 
or she has already achieved financial security also increases.   
37 
 
 
 
Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007). Therefore, as their wealth increases, executives 
become “increasingly less risk averse” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 62). For the same reasons that 
wealthier executives are less likely to try to reduce firm risk through unrelated 
diversification, wealthier executives are also more willing to take strategic actions that 
increase firm risk, which include but are certainly not limited to R&D investments. In 
other words, firm risk represents a collection of multiple strategic actions, which 
together help to determine the firm’s overall risk profile. The effect of wealth is to 
mitigate risk aversion, making top managers more willing to take risks that are beneficial 
to the firm. Because of the financial security and diversification benefits personal wealth 
provides, wealthy TMTs are less likely to be dissuaded from accepting positive NPV 
projects by the amount of risk involved, and should be more willing to accept a greater 
variety of investments and strategies, even if they entail risk. Preliminary empirical 
evidence supports the idea that wealth is an important factor in decisions regarding risk. 
A study by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) showed that a socio-economic factor, 
which included wealth, income, authority and position, was significantly correlated with 
greater risk taking on 3 of the 7 risk factors included in the study.  Moreover, the 
findings of Hung et al. (2012) suggest that managerial portfolio diversification (which is 
likely to increase with external wealth) is positively related to the firm’s leverage ratio.  
 In sum, top management team wealth should be positively related to firm risk, 
such that firms with wealthier TMT members, who are willing to take and bear more 
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firm-specific risk, exhibit greater risk than firms with relatively less wealthy TMTs.
7
 
Thus:  
Hypothesis 3: TMT average personal wealth is positively related to firm risk. 
 
The Moderating Effects of TMT Diversity 
 
 The arguments presented thus far focus on the main effects of executives’ wealth. 
However, executive actions occur in a context in which contingencies exist. I now 
consider important contingencies. Specifically, the arguments that follow introduce and 
evaluate the impact of diversity on the theoretical model’s predictions. Harrison and 
Klein (2007), in their review and extension of the theory and research on diversity, 
proposed that diversity can assume three different forms: separation (differences on a 
particular dimension along a continuum), variation (differences in kind), and disparity 
(differences is concentration or distribution of a valued good, such as pay or within-
group status, among unit members). Below, I address two particular forms of diversity in 
the context of my model.  
 First, I argue that wealth diversity or differences in wealth within a top 
management team represent separation: differences along a continuum on the dimension 
of personal wealth and the resulting financial security. As Harrison and Klein (2007) 
discuss, diversity as separation is usually conceptualized under the following 
                                                          
7
 One might in fact expect a curvilinear relationship, because once wealth has increased to the point that 
the managers would act in an effectively risk-neutral manner, there is no clear theoretical reason that 
additional wealth would increase the amount of risk that they would take, and thus the relationship curve 
would “flatten out.” However, the difficulty in estimating this relationship is that the point at which the 
amount of risk is optimal for the firm can differ for each individual firm, and the optimal amount of risk 
cannot be directly observed by the researcher. Thus, it is unclear how one could determine or estimate the 
average risk-neutral “tipping point” (the point at which the relationship between wealth and firm risk 
ceases to be positive and significant). Nevertheless, the first order relationship would still be positive. 
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assumptions: members within units (e.g., teams) differ along a single continuous 
attribute, for example, in positive affect; and units (i.e., teams) differ in the extent to 
which members are clustered or separated along the continuum. 
 Next, I argue that diversity in pay or top management pay dispersion represents 
disparity: within units, members differ “in the extent to which they hold or receive a 
share, amount, or proportion” of a socially-valued good, and units differ as to how the 
good is distributed among members (e.g., equal versus disproportionate distribution) 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1206). These arguments are further developed below.   
 TMT wealth differential and diversity as separation. Diversity in accumulated 
personal wealth within a top management team, or TMT wealth diversity, best 
corresponds to the conceptualization of diversity as separation: “differences in position 
or opinion among unit members” or “horizontal distance along a single continuum 
representing dissimilarity in a particular attitude” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200). 
Specifically, differences in personal wealth between TMT members represent 
differences in their attitude/preferences regarding firm decisions related to risk (i.e., 
firm-level risk taking). For the reasons outlined in the previous section, members of the 
top management team with greater amounts of external wealth are less risk-averse with 
respect to firm projects compared to the less wealthy team members. Separation on this 
attribute is likely to create disagreement and divergent opinions regarding the task at 
hand (Harrison & Klein, 2007), here – making strategic decisions involving risk. As 
such, TMT wealth differential contributes to decision or task conflict (Jehn, 1997).  
 Because of the divergent attitudes toward risk, when TMT diversity is high, the 
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resulting firm risk posture is likely to reflect a compromise among the top managers. 
Wealth diversity contributes to task conflict in this context, which creates greater 
discussion of differing viewpoints, alternatives, and challenging the status quo (Jehn, 
1995). Therefore, is it is more likely that a certain degree of compromise will be reached 
when TMT members differ greatly on the wealth continuum; a large variance in personal 
wealth will thus buffer the effect of average TMT wealth. On the other hand, when the 
TMT wealth differential is low, “No one challenges anyone else’s position on the (…) 
continuum, because each of their positions is equivalent” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 
1204). In this situation, the relationship between TMT average personal wealth and the 
firm-level outcomes of interest will be stronger than when TMT wealth diversity is high. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 4a: TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and R&D intensity, such that the relationship is 
weaker when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when TMT wealth 
diversity is low. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and unrelated diversification, such that the 
relationship is weaker when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when 
TMT wealth diversity is low. 
 
Hypothesis 4c: TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and firm risk, such that the relationship is weaker 
when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when TMT wealth diversity is 
low. 
 
 Top management team behavioral integration. According to Hambrick (2007: 
366), top management behavioral integration can be defined as the “degree to which a 
TMT engages in mutual and collective interaction” and is an additional refinement of the 
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upper echelons logic. He introduced this construct based on his observations that many 
TMTs share few team characteristics (Hambrick, 1994; 1995). It was intended as a 
substantial refinement of upper echelons theory, and aimed to “capture the level of the 
senior team’s wholeness and unity of effort” (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006: 
647). At a basic level, it reflects how well managers work together (Chen, Lin, & 
Michel, 2010).  
 Behavioral integration affects the degree to which group-level properties, such as 
average top management team wealth, are reflected in organizational outcomes. Teams 
that are highly behaviorally integrated will have stronger relationships between group-
level characteristics than teams with low levels of behavioral integration. Below, I 
develop arguments about how diversity as disparity is likely to influence relationship 
conflict within the team, and thus make achieving behavioral integration more 
challenging.
8
 
  TMT pay dispersion and diversity as disparity. The dollar amount and 
“deservingness” of executive compensation packages has been the subject of both 
academic and public debate, especially in the last two decades (Core, Guay, & Larker, 
2008; Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006; Walsh, 2008). While 
much of this discussion focuses on the average trend of increasing executive 
compensation size, a stream of literature on compensation highlights the variation of 
rewards between executives.  
                                                          
8 Studies are beginning to assess behavioral integration more directly using survey measures; for example, 
prior studies employed surveys in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in New 
England (Lubatkin et al., 2006) and firms in Taiwan (Chen et al., 2010). However, this study’s setting 
(large U.S. public corporations) would make achieving satisfactory responses extraordinarily difficult. 
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 TMT pay dispersion is best conceptualized as a disparity type of diversity: 
“differences in concentration of valued social assets or resources such as pay and status 
among unit members” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200). The dispersion of pay within a 
top management team is particularly well-suited to the category of disparity, because the 
current level of pay at the firm confers both status within the firm’s hierarchy (Christie 
& Barling, 2010) and signals the value of the particular team member to the organization 
(Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003). Thus, pay level becomes a basis for comparison 
among team members, as it signifies “relative worth” to the organization (Bloom, 1999: 
26). Moreover, when “disparity in a group is at its maximum, one member of the unit 
outranks all others” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1207), which is the case in a vast majority 
of organizations, with the CEO outranking other top managers in terms of status, power, 
recognition and pay. Finally, although private organizations often resort to pay secrecy 
(Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires that the compensation of the top five executives
9
 of publicly-traded 
firms be disclosed, making it highly salient and the comparisons easy.  
 Pay dispersion is said to influence a host of organizational outcomes, including 
firm performance, but accumulated empirical evidence is not consistent as to whether 
this effect is positive or negative (Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009). Similarly, different 
theories predict different outcomes, offering competing insights (Shaw & Gupta, 2007). 
Research on pay dispersion in the behavioral tradition is usually rooted in equity theory 
                                                          
9 
The CEO and the four highest paid members of his or her team (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 
2010). Because further disclosure is not required, compensation for other TMT members is rarely 
reported. 
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(Adams, 1965), or its derivative, relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Martin, 
1981, 1982). Both perspectives, which fall within the broader distributive justice 
literature (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990),
10
 suggest that more equal 
pay promotes teamwork and collaboration (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001).
11
 
Conversely, pay dispersion fuels feelings of inequity and injustice, potentially leading to 
greater conflict, competition between team members, and even sometimes political 
sabotage (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, large pay dispersion can negatively 
affect employee morale, effort, individual job performance, and‒‒ultimately‒‒be 
detrimental to organizational effectiveness and performance.  
 Research on pay dispersion in the economic tradition, on the other hand, builds 
on tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986), which suggests that large 
pay gaps act as “prizes” in a corporate tournament and incentivizes employees to expend 
greater effort, so that they may be promoted to a higher level within the organization 
(see Devaro, 2006, for a recent example). Thus, pay dispersion is akin to a self-policing 
mechanism, which allows the “cream to rise to the top” (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & 
Sanders, 2010), enhancing organizational efficiency and performance.  
 Empirical studies have found some support for both theories (Gerhart et al., 
2009), and the theories seem equally matched concerning their empirical support and 
predictions regarding firm performance (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001). In contrast to 
                                                          
10
 See Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng (2001) for a review. 
11
 The key difference between the two theories is that equity theory suggests that individuals compare their 
inputs (i.e., effort) and outputs (i.e., organizational rewards, including pay) to those of a referent other. 
Relative deprivation theory however, does not rely on such ratios and “involves comparisons of outcomes 
with little regard for differences in inputs, such as effort, ability, or skills” (Henderson & Fredrickson, 
2001: 97).  
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more distal organizational outcomes, such as firm performance, the predictions for pay 
disparity concerning group dynamics are unequivocal. Social comparisons carry 
tremendous power (Moore & Klein, 2008), especially in the context of a TMT, as top 
executives tend to be achievement-oriented and status-driven (Fredrickson et al., 2010), 
which can amplify feelings of injustice resulting from differences in pay. Also, top 
managers in non-CEO positions are in competition for the coveted spot at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy both with the current CEO and fellow TMT-members, and 
“perceive that they can gain by stepping over” (Fama, 1980: 293) those above them. 
Thus, pay dispersion is likely to generate conflict and competition within the team, 
including self-serving behaviors at the expense of other team members (Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 2001). As such, because lower pay dispersion promotes cohesiveness, 
cooperation and reduces conflict, when work is interdependent, theory suggests that a 
more compressed pay structure is preferable (Deutsch, 1985; Pfeffer, 1995; Shaw, 
Gupta, & Delery, 2002).  
 Extant research supports the collaboration‒competition tradeoff. In work 
contexts where teamwork is considered vital, pay dispersion within a team has been 
shown to decrease team performance, including NFL teams (Mondello & Maxcy, 2009) 
and major league baseball teams (Bloom, 1999). Pay dispersion has also been shown to 
decrease satisfaction, individual research productivity, and reduce the likelihood of 
working collaboratively in academic settings (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). In the context 
of top management teams, studies found pay disparity to be detrimental to organizational 
performance when work is considered more interdependent – when the degree of 
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internationalization is high (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004), and in high technology firms 
(Siegel & Hambrick 2005). Moreover, research shows that relatively compressed pay 
structures create a more egalitarian environment, promoting managerial retention, while 
pay dispersion is positively related to managerial turnover (Bloom & Michel, 2002).  
 In sum, the above arguments unambiguously suggest that TMT pay dispersion 
will make achieving TMT behavioral integration more challenging as a result of 
increased likelihood of relationship conflict (Jehn, 1997). Because TMT characteristics 
have a less strong influence on firm-level outcomes when behavioral integration is 
weaker, TMT pay dispersion will moderate (buffer) the impact of TMT average wealth 
on unrelated diversification, R&D intensity, and firm risk. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 5a: TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and R&D intensity, such that the relationship is 
weaker when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT pay 
dispersion is low. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and unrelated diversification, such that the 
relationship is weaker when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT 
pay dispersion is low. 
 
 Hypothesis 5c: TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the relationship 
between TMT average wealth and firm risk, such that the relationship is weaker 
when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT pay dispersion is low. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Sources and Estimation of Personal Wealth  
Work in sociology recognizes that an individual’s total wealth consists of two 
components – personal, human, and physical wealth that is obtained through family 
relations, education, etc., and wealth acquired through employment relations (Sørensen, 
2000); herein, I concentrate on the latter, investigating the impact of individual 
accumulated wealth. Current SEC regulations do not require firms to report the total 
wealth of executives, and there are no other archival data sources that provide access to 
this type of information in the United States. As Core and Guay (2010) discuss, for 
several reasons, information on executive personal wealth may never become available. 
However, compensation arrangements must be disclosed, including cash compensation, 
equity and option grants, and other forms of compensation paid to the executive. I 
therefore estimate personal (external) wealth based on the past compensation earned by 
the executive (thus, personal wealth estimated herein is not contingent on current or 
future compensation, consistent with my definition), and then aggregate it to the TMT 
(firm) level as explained below.
12
  
Executive compensation data including cash, equity, bonus and other 
compensation, as well as other information on individual executives, is collected for all 
the S&P 1500 firms from Compustat’s Execucomp database, starting with the first year 
                                                          
12
 This likely represents a conservative estimate of personal wealth; this issue is discussed in more detail in 
the next subsection, which outlines personal wealth estimation. 
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of available data, for the period from 1992 through 2008. Firm-level independent and 
control variables are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Data on firm governance 
characteristics are obtained from Risk Metrics, and data on institutional ownership from 
Thompson Financial Institutional Holdings database. Finally, data on marginal 
individual tax rates are obtained from the Internal Revenue Service website. 
Executive personal wealth model. Using data on executive compensation from 
1992 through 2001, I calculate an initial executive personal wealth endowment at the 
end of 2001. I place a restriction on my sample requiring that the data for the executive 
be available for at least 5 years for them to be included. This means that the individual 
was employed as one of the top five executives at an S&P1500 firm for at least 5 years 
during the initial sample period, but not necessarily at the same firm, as using an 
executive identifier I can track executives across firms.
 
This restriction ensures some 
degree of consistency in the measure and alleviates potential problems, which could 
arise due to a short wealth estimation period.  
I calculate my estimate of executive personal wealth based on 1992-2001 data 
under a number assumptions, which are arguably very conservative in nature. First, 
executives are assumed to save and consume at the average rate for high-income 
individuals. In an extensive study, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) estimate the 
average saving rate for high-income households based on several years of data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics. In my model, I use .236, or 23.6%, which was the estimate 
provided by Dynan et al. (2004) for the group of individuals in the highest income 
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quintile;
13
 all of the executives in my sample meet the annual income threshold for that 
group ($83,131 in 1992). Second, the value of accumulated savings is calculated based 
on two different rates, the return of the S&P 500 index each year over the sample period, 
as well as the risk-free rate.
14
 I ensure that my results are robust to either specification as 
discussed later, but I present the results based on the market return, as there are index 
funds available to individual investors which track the S&P 500 portfolio, and such an 
investment results in a reasonable degree of diversification. Third, I use the highest 
marginal tax rate bracket each year to derive income after tax for each executive. While 
the Internal Revenue Service each year reports summary statistics for high-income tax 
returns, several measures are put in place to make the data anonymous and available 
only in the aggregate. Therefore, I am unable to estimate the precise effective tax rate for 
each executive or even the average effective tax rate for high-income individuals. 
However, using the highest individual marginal tax rate is more conservative and 
potentially less biased, and should provide a lower-bound estimate of personal wealth.  
Finally, I assume that executive personal wealth at the beginning of 1992, the 
first year the information is available in Execucomp, is zero. Clearly, this is a very 
conservative assumption, and may not be the case in most instances.  
A simplified model of personal wealth is represented by the following formula, 
where X   is income after tax, C is consumption (the inverse of the saving rate), and r is 
the average interest rate over the period (the interest rate is not assumed to be constant 
                                                          
13 
More precise estimates are not available. 
14
 The risk-free rate is obtained from Execucomp to coincide with the rate used to calculate Black-Scholes 
option values. 
49 
 
 
 
over time):  
                   
 
    
           
      
The marginal tax rates and the rates of return for the sample period are shown in Table 
B1. 
Types of compensation included in the income calculation are cash compensation 
(salary and bonus) and income received from executive stock options upon their sale by 
the executive. This is because the goal is to derive executive personal or external wealth 
– the portion that is not tied to the firm (and by definition must exclude wealth vested in 
firm equity, which is controlled for separately). I calculate executive wealth endowment 
at the end of 2001 and, importantly, update the estimate each year following the same 
methodology (through 2008). I then conduct hypothesis testing over the 2002-2008 
period. Further details on the calculation of the executive personal wealth variable not 
discussed in this section are provided in the following section, along with a description 
of the aggregation procedure to arrive at the estimate of TMT wealth.   
Clearly, my measure provides a conservative, lower-bound estimate of executive 
wealth. Reliable information on executive wealth from non- employment relations is 
simply not available. This means that the statistical analyses should provide a 
conservative test of my hypotheses. If the my estimates suggest that executives are less 
wealthy, but they indeed are very wealthy (for example, through family bequests), I 
would underestimate average TMT wealth and wealth differential thereby making 
support for my main hypotheses less likely. Moreover, my reliance on data provided in 
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audited and certified statements increases the validity of the measure. Finally, because 
my measure is based on publicly available data for executives of large firms (arguably, 
the most widely studied group by governance researchers), it lends itself to systematic 
study by future governance/compensation research. While studying wealth acquired 
through bequests or family ties may undeniably lead to new insights, it does not allow 
for as much generalizability as studying wealth obtained through past employment. 
 Nevertheless, to confirm the validity of my external wealth proxy, I investigate 
the correlation of the wealth measure with one popular business press ranking, the 
Forbes 400 Richest Americans, for the year 2001 (the last year of my estimation model, 
before I begin hypothesis testing). 53 executives for whom I was able to estimate wealth 
also made the Forbes list. As expected, my estimates are overall much lower compared 
to the Forbes estimates, as the magazine aims to include all forms and symbols of wealth 
(houses, boats, etc.), including wealth tied up in the firm’s stock, which is contrary to my 
goals. The correlation of my measure and the Forbes index is 0.17 ‒ modest, but 
positive. However, because of small sample size (53 matched observations), this statistic 
is highly sensitive to outliers. If I exclude four outliers from the computation,
15
 the 
correlation is 0.70. It is also important to note that I am using a firm average TMT 
wealth; as such, the impact of extreme individual outliers should decrease. Moreover, I 
am relying on a much broader sample (the final sample consists of over 700 firms, with 
at least three executive wealth estimates from each firm per year). 
 
                                                          
15
 Those observations are: Warren Buffet (Berkshire Hathaway), Sumner Redstone (Viacom), Steven 
Ballmer (Microsoft), and Michael Eisner (Disney).  
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Measures 
 Dependent variables. Unrelated diversification is measured using an SIC-based 
entropy index (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993) at time t+1. Following Hitt, 
Hoskisson and Kim (1997), I calculate the entropy index as follows:        
   i ii PP 1ln , 
where Pi represents the proportion of sales attributed to business segment “i.” The 
advantage of this measure is that, in addition to being validated and extensively used in 
strategic management research, it applies both to related and unrelated diversification 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Thus, following Lim et al. (2009) I compute separate 
indices for related and unrelated diversification (DR and DU respectively); where the 
total diversification index (DT) is the sum of these two.  
 R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditures divided by annual firm sales 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Devers, 
McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008). I use a one-year lag for this dependent variable 
(the variable is measured at time t+1 relative to the independent variable). Following 
SEC rules, COMPUSTAT does not report “very small R&D amounts that are not 
material to a firm's decision-making” (NSF, 2010). Because of this, many values for 
R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT appear to be missing; as they are not missing-at-
random (MAR), however, these observations cannot be simply omitted from analysis. 
Since the 1970’s,16 firms have been required to separately expense all but negligible 
                                                          
16
 In 1974, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issues SFAS (Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards) no. 2, which required all firms to expense R&D costs as they are incurred, 
effectively banning the deferral/capitalization method of accounting for R&D costs (prior to the 
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R&D investments (O’Brien, 2003; White, Sondhi, and Fried, 1994); thus, treating 
missing values as negligible investment, or “unobservable minimal R&D expenses” 
(Chen & Miller, 2007: 372), is both theoretically justifiable and common practice 
(O’Brien, 2003).17 Thus, following previous studies (e.g., Chang & Dasgupta, 2009; 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; O’Brien, 2003; Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009), I 
replace missing R&D values with a 0, treating extremely low levels as zero investment.
18
 
Firm risk is operationalized as volatility, or the variance of the firm’s daily stock 
return during the year (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). This conceptualization of risk is chosen due to its relevance to theory and 
its implication for shareholders. Again, a one-year lag is employed (the variable is 
measured at t+1). 
Independent variable. Executive personal (external) wealth is measured as 
outlined in the previous section, based on past cash (salary and bonus) and option 
compensation.
19
 Proceeds from stock options are incorporated into the measure as they 
are exercised, under the assumption that the executive sells the stock (instead of 
exercising the option and holding onto the firm’s stock), as in the vast majority of cases 
this action would be in the best interest of the executive. About 95% of stock options are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
statement’s release firms could select to capitalize R&D expenses). FAS no. 2 also provided a strict and 
inclusive definition of what constitutes both research and development, affording firms with little leeway 
in determining what constitutes R&D. 
17
 R&D expenses are reported as one aggregate item; therefore, it is unlikely that R&D reporting provides 
valuable, private information to competitors. 
18
 Following other studies, I used a dummy variable to control for the potential effect of this treatment as a 
robustness check (e.g., Huang & Ritter, 2009; Uotila et al., 2009). The results are substantively unchanged 
from those reported. 
19
 As discussed later, I conduct robustness checks using a version of the wealth measure based solely on 
cash compensation to ensure that the results are not driven by option-specific factors. 
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issued as non-qualified stock options, which means that they are taxed at the personal 
income tax rate on option sale profits (Jin & Kothari, 2008). Thus, I incorporate tax 
considerations for all stock option sales treating them as nonqualified stock options.  
I then aggregate the individual executive wealth measures to the team (i.e., firm) 
level for each year, starting in 2001. Based on Chan’s (1998) typology of composition 
models, average TMT wealth is conceptualized as an additive model; within-group 
agreement is not necessary.
20
 Thus, this variable is calculated as the simple average of 
the individual executive wealth measures within a single TMT. Teams for which 
personal wealth data on less than three members are available are excluded from further 
analysis. The variable was then log-transformed due to skewness.
21
  
Moderator variables. TMT wealth diversity is measured using a Gini coefficient 
(e.g., Bloom, 1999; Brown et al. 2003; Shaw et al., 2002): 
            
                    
 
   
                
 
where the numerator represents the sum of all pairwise absolute differences between 
members on team k (Harrison & Klein, 2007), n is the number of team members, and 
           is the mean TMT wealth. 
Following prior research, TMT pay dispersion is also measured using a Gini 
coefficient (e.g., Bloom, 1999; Brown et al. 2003; Shaw et al., 2002): 
                                                          
20 
Within-group agreement, or rather the degree of disagreement/variance, is addressed theoretically and 
modeled separately. 
21
 Upon transformation, the variable meets the criteria to be considered normally distributed. The only 
change in the interpretation is that the variable metric is now in log form, so the impact of wealth will 
decrease as wealth increases, which is consistent with decreasing marginal utility of wealth; as such, this 
measure is superior on both theoretical and empirical grounds. However, the results are substantively 
unchanged if I use the raw, untransformed variable.  
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where the numerator represents the sum of all pairwise absolute differences between 
members on team k (Harrison & Klein, 2007), n is the number of team members, and 
        is the mean team pay. Following Bloom & Michel (2002), I compute two 
versions of the coefficient – one using total compensation (salary, all forms of incentive 
pay, and other compensation), and one based solely on salary and bonus data.  
 Control variables. Several controls are included following prior literature on 
diversification, innovation and/or firm-level risk. Both firm size and firm performance 
have been proposed to influence both firm risk and diversification (Deutsch et al., 2011; 
Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007). Therefore, I include a control for 
firm size (measured as natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; Lim et al., 2009; 
Marki, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006) and firm performance, which is operationalized as 
stock return or total shareholder return, calculated as change in share price over the year 
plus dividends divided by beginning-of-the-year price (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). I also include a control for free cash flow, which can 
encourage unrelated acquisitions (Jensen, 1986).  
 A number of control variables for the firm’s governance characteristics are also 
included. Duality is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the 
Board and 0 otherwise (Fong et al., 2010; Tuggle et al., 2010; Takacs Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010). Board size is the total number of directors on board (Coles, Daniel, & 
Naveen, 2008; Deutsch et al., 2011). Proportion of outside directors is measured as the 
percentage of non-firm executives on board (Dalton et al., 1998; Deutsch et al., 2011; 
55 
 
 
 
Wright et al., 2006); outsider ownership, calculated as the percentage of the firm’s stock 
owned by outside directors, is included as a proxy for outsiders’ incentive to monitor 
(Goranova et al., 2007). Moreover, I control for the percentage of institutional investor 
ownership (Deutsch et al., 2011; Kor, 2006). 
 Next, I include controls at the TMT level. Observable differences, such as age 
and gender, are correlated with and are thought to represent differences in underlying 
perspectives, experiences, and cognitive schemas (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Milliken 
& Martins, 1996). Extant research suggests TMT heterogeneity may affect top 
management team behavioral integration, with more diverse teams likely to exhibit 
lower levels of behavioral integration (Amason, Shrader, & Tompson, 2006; Carpenter, 
2002; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Miliken & Martins, 1996). TMT heterogeneity is 
measured using Blau’s index (Blau, 1977). I calculate standardized Blau index measures 
for diversity in age, gender and tenure at the firm. The diversity of age and gender are 
included because both represent salient observable demographic characteristics,
22
 and 
are important determinants of individuals’ social identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Additionally, tenure diversity reflects differences in shared experiences, as well as 
differences in time-based frames of reference, and internal and external network ties 
associated with cohort effects (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Harrison & Klein, 2007).  
I then create a composite measure of TMT heterogeneity, treating the three individual 
proxies as formative indicators (i.e., they need not co-vary and load on one underlying 
construct). I also include controls for TMT average tenure and TMT average age, as 
                                                          
22
 Data on executive ethnicity is not available for non-inside-directors. 
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these characteristics may influence executives’ willingness to take risks; moreover, the 
likelihood that an executive has already achieved financial security also increases with 
age/tenure, making it important to control for the independent effects of age and tenure. 
To control for the amount of wealth that managers have tied to the focal firm, I include 
measures of TMT average $ owned (the amount of firm-specific wealth, expressed in 
dollar amounts based on executive share ownership and the value of firm shares at the 
end of the firm’s fiscal year) and TMT average % ownership (percentage ownership of 
firm equity outstanding). I also control for TMT average total compensation.
23
  
Finally, year dummy variables are included to control for general 
macroeconomic fluctuations and other time-dependent variation. The inclusion of time 
dummy variables also deals with the issue of contemporaneous correlation in panelized 
data (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). 
  
                                                          
23
 Controlling for different types of compensation separately did not affect the results. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
Analysis 
 Given the panel structure of my data, I use model specification with firm effects 
(except is some tests of robustness), and use the Hausman test to select between fixed-
effects and random-effects models.
24
 In the case of firm risk as a dependent variable, the 
test confirms that a fixed effect is necessary. In analyses with R&D intensity and 
unrelated diversification as the dependent variables the data are analyzed using a tobit 
model to account for the limited nature of these variables (i.e., the value has a limited 
range and cannot be below zero) and a high number of observations that take the value 
of the lower limit of zero (Chen & Miller, 2007). Distinct from standard panel models, in 
which fixed effect estimates are always consistent, the reverse is true in a tobit 
framework, and fixed effects are not appropriate in this setting. In this case, a random 
effects model is used, as a conditional-effect model cannot be estimated, because “there 
does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the 
likelihood” (Stata10, 2007: 455). Additionally, while an unconditional fixed effects 
model might be estimated, the resulting estimates are biased (Stata10, 2007) and cannot 
be considered reliable, making any statistical inference potentially invalid. As such, I use 
tobit models with a firm random effect for my primary analyses, and conduct several 
robustness checks (including alternative models) as discussed later. 
                                                          
24
 Generally, a fixed effects model is always consistent, but less efficient; a random effects model is more 
efficient, but not consistent if the effect being estimated is correlated with the error term. 
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When available (based on the type of analysis), I use clustered robust standard 
errors in all regressions to mitigate concerns about heteroskedasticity and account for 
intragroup correlation (here, the errors are clustered by a firm identifier). This 
specification provides for a more conservative test of my hypotheses. Finally, all 
significance tests in the models reflect a two-tailed test. 
Results 
 All the continuous variables used in creating interaction terms were first mean-
centered. Based on multicollinearity diagnostics, all of the individual variable VIF 
values were below 4 and the mean VIF was below 2.5 for all models, which is well 
below the recommended threshold of 10; these results indicate that multicollinearity is 
not a concern. Table B2 lists descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for the 
variables. The mean top management team average wealth is $2.83 million (the average 
value for my key construct), but there is considerable variance across firms/teams, as 
evidenced by the $4.27 million standard deviation. TMT average wealth is correlated 
with TMT average pay at .53, which is to be expected given the variable construction; it 
is important to point out, however, that the two variables share only 28.1% of variance, 
and the remaining variance is unique. Wealth is also similarly related to firm size (22.1% 
shared variance), partly because total pay and firm size are highly correlated (as 
expected based on prior research).   
Table B3 shows the results of tobit panel regressions for R&D intensity. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that average TMT personal wealth is positively related to R&D 
investments. In Model 2 of Table B3, the coefficient of the average TMT wealth 
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variable shows a positive and statistically significant (p<0.001) relationship with R&D 
intensity, thereby providing strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
Table B4 shows the results of tobit panel regressions for unrelated 
diversification. Hypothesis 2 stated that average TMT personal wealth is negatively 
related to unrelated diversification. In Model 2 of Table B4, the coefficient of the 
average TMT wealth variable shows a negative and statistically significant (p<0.001) 
relationship with unrelated diversification, which provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
 Table B5 shows the results of the fixed effect regression models for firm risk. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that average TMT personal wealth is positively related to firm risk. 
In Model 2 of Table B5, the coefficient of the average TMT wealth variable shows a 
positive and statistically significant (p<0.001) relationship with firm risk, which 
provides support for Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4a suggested that TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the 
relationship between average TMT wealth and R&D intensity, such that the relationship 
is weaker when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when TMT wealth diversity 
is low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and wealth diversity in 
Model 3 of Table B3 is statistically significant (p<.05), but in the opposite direction to 
the one hypothesized (i.e., positive); thus, the hypothesis does not receive support. 
 Hypothesis 4b suggested that TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the 
relationship between average TMT wealth and unrelated diversification, such that the 
relationship is weaker when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when TMT 
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wealth diversity is low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and 
within-team wealth diversity in Model 3 of Table B4 is not statistically significant 
(p>.10), thereby providing no support for the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4c suggested that TMT wealth diversity negatively moderates the 
relationship between average TMT wealth and firm risk, such that the relationship is 
weaker when TMT wealth diversity is high, and stronger when TMT wealth diversity is 
low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and wealth diversity in 
Model 3 of Table B5 is not statistically significant, providing no support for this 
hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 5a stated that TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the 
relationship between average TMT wealth and R&D intensity, such that the relationship 
is weaker when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT pay dispersion is 
low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and within-team pay 
dispersion in Model 3 of Table B3 is not statistically significant (p>.10), providing no 
support for hypothesis 5a. 
Hypothesis 5b stated that TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the 
relationship between average TMT wealth and unrelated diversification, such that the 
relationship is weaker when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT pay 
dispersion is low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and within-
team pay dispersion in Model 3 of Table B4 is positive and statistically significant 
(p<.05), providing support for hypothesis 5b. 
 Hypothesis 5c stated that TMT pay dispersion negatively moderates the 
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relationship between average TMT wealth and firm risk, such that the relationship is 
weaker when TMT pay dispersion is high, and stronger when TMT pay dispersion is 
low. The coefficient of the interaction between average wealth and within-team pay 
dispersion Model 3 of Table B5 is not statistically significant, which provides no support 
for hypothesis 5c. 
Robustness Checks 
Alternative model specifications. A potential concern is that the variance in 
unrelated diversification and R&D intensity is driven to a substantial degree by industry 
membership. I take a number of steps to ameliorate this concern. First, although a firm 
effect accounts for the firm’s industry membership, the results of the first two 
hypotheses were replicated using industry rather than firm effects.
25
 Second, the analysis 
was performed using industry-adjusted dependent variables; the adjustment was made 
based on 3-digit SIC industry in a given year (industry-year) and data from the entire 
Compustat universe (as opposed to my specific sample). In this case, a firm fixed effect 
analysis was used,
26
 because the industry-adjustment transformed the dependent variable 
from a censored, limited variable to a true interval measure. The results of these analyses 
were substantively unchanged from those reported above (i.e., the sign and significance 
levels of coefficients on the hypothesized variables did not change), confirming that 
TMT average wealth is negatively related to unrelated diversification and positively 
related to R&D investments.  
                                                          
25
 Two-digit SIC industry membership was used, as there was insufficient number of observations in each 
group to permit the use of three-digit SIC codes.  
26
 The conclusions remain unchanged if an industry fixed effect is used. 
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Alternative measures of average TMT wealth. All of the analyses were also 
performed using a measure of wealth based on a risk-free investment rate of return in 
lieu of the rate of return on the S&P500 portfolio. The results for all three dependent 
variables‒‒unrelated diversification, R&D intensity and firm risk‒‒were substantively 
unchanged. Second, the analyses were performed using a measure of wealth based on 
cash only compensation (both using the risk-free and the S&P500 rate of return); the 
results were substantively unchanged, suggesting that they are not driven by option-
specific factors. Third, I used a measure of external (personal) wealth scaled by the 
amount of internal wealth (i.e., wealth that is tied to the firm through stock ownership - 
total value of all stock owned and total value of unexercised options). This variable is 
calculated as the dollar amount of average TMT external personal wealth divided by the 
dollar amount of average TMT firm wealth based on the current value
27
 of their 
unexercised options and holdings of firm stock. The TMT average ownership in dollars 
is thus omitted from the list of control variables in these models, as it is now present in 
the denominator of Avg. TMT wealth (R). Because these analyses are a much more 
substantial departure from the current measurement of wealth, the results of these 
analyses are presented in Table B6 (for unrelated diversification and R&D intensity) and 
Table B7 (for firm risk).
28
  The results using the ratio measure of wealth are similar to 
those reported above and the conclusions remain unchanged.  
Alternative measures of TMT wealth diversity. The primary results presented in 
Tables B3‒B5 results use a measure of wealth diversity based on the Gini coefficient. I 
                                                          
27 Using end of the fiscal year prices to correspond with the ownership reporting time period. 
28
 Detailed results of other robustness checks are also available upon request. 
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investigated several alternatives; however, no other measure proved suitable. Some 
alternatives were unsuitable due to severe multicollinearity concerns. TMT wealth 
diversity operationalized as the within-unit standard deviation (S.D.) of average TMT 
wealth (Harrison & Klein, 2007), the most basic measure of within-group diversity, 
exhibited a 0.90 pairwise correlation with the main independent variable (i.e., average 
TMT wealth). Even a log-transformed version of the TMT standard deviation of wealth 
was correlated at >0.70, resulting in a VIF >10 for the interaction of TMT wealth and 
TMT wealth diversity. A measure of diversity as a coefficient of variation (Allison, 
1978; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) was suboptimal for multiple 
reasons, both theoretical and empirical,
29
 and its use resulted in extreme VIF values 
(variable VIFs above 200).  
DeRue, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, and Feltz (2010), theoretically examined different 
forms of dispersion in teams, and recommended the use of other moments of the 
distribution, such as skewness and kurtosis, to assess the degree of dispersion within a 
group on a given characteristic. However, they also note that for small groups (5 
members or less, as in this study), these sample statistics may be unstable and thus 
unsuitable; as such, they advocate a novel use of the rwg statistic, normally used to 
evaluate within-group “agreement.” The rwg assesses the variable distribution relative to 
the variance that would be expected based on a specific null distribution; however, it is 
impossible to calculate it in this study, as it relies on a scale-type measure (such as a 7-
point Likert scale) in order to calculate an expected distribution.  
                                                          
29
 Multiplying a coefficient of variation of team wealth [which is calculated as (S.D./mean)] with the 
average (mean) team wealth to yield the interaction would simplify to a standard deviation. 
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I also investigated the possibility that wealth diversity is best represented as the 
difference between the wealth of the CEO and the rest of the top management team 
(CEO to rest-of-TMT personal wealth). This may account for decision conflict or a 
difference in power between the CEO and the remainder of the team, and may be 
theoretically similar to a “minority belief”-type of distribution (DeRue, Hollenbeck, 
Ilgen, & Feltz, 2010), in which one member differs significantly from the rest of the 
group. I created two versions of this measure: one as a ratio, and another as the simple 
difference between the CEO and rest-of-TMT average wealth. Neither of these variables 
was a statistically significant moderator of the average TMT wealth.  
 Alternative measures of pay dispersion. As an alternative to the Gini coefficient 
based on total team pay, I constructed a Gini index measure using only cash pay. The 
results of the analyses with this measure were similar; the p-values were somewhat 
lower, but this did not affect the overall significance levels and ultimate conclusions. I 
also developed models using the coefficient of variation (Allison, 1978; Fredrickson et 
al., 2010; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) as an alternative to the Gini coefficient: 
          
                    
         
       
 
where      is the pay of i
th 
individual on team k, n is the number of team members, and 
        is the mean team pay. Following prior studies, I completed analyses with two 
alternative versions of this variable – one based on total pay, and one using only base 
cash pay (salary and bonus). The results were substantively unchanged from those 
reported above.  
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  Other tests of robustness. I conducted several other robustness checks by 
including a number of additional control variables. Available slack has been found to 
influence the amount of funds available for R&D, and was thus included as an additional 
control, calculated as the firm’s ratio of assets to liabilities (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1989). A firm’s leverage may also influence its ability to fund long-term projects 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989); therefore the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio (Kochhar & 
David, 1996) was also included as a control variable. Neither was statistically significant 
in the regressions and the results were unchanged with their inclusion; thus they were 
omitted from primary analyses.  
 Research also suggests that gender may influence risk-taking – meta-analytic 
evidence points to the fact that males generally exhibit greater risk-taking behavior 
compared to females, although the gender gap appears to be decreasing over time 
(Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). Thus, I calculated the proportion of females on each 
top management team and re-estimated the models controlling for the effect of female 
executive proportion. The results were unchanged and the variable was not statistically 
significant, possibly due to demonstrable lack of gender diversity among top executives 
of S&P1500 companies (the median team had no females present, and the average 
female proportion was only 5%).  
 Moreover, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) document that “formative early-life 
experiences,” such as growing up in the Great Depression, may influence managerial 
willingness to undertake risk and subsequently influence firm leverage ratios. It is 
conceivable that such experience may also influence other risk-related firm outcomes, 
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such as R&D investments. In order to account for this possibility, I create a “Depression 
baby” dummy variable, similar to Malmendier et al. (2011). I then code all firms with at 
least one “Depression baby” executive present. Due to the more recent time period of my 
sample, there are very few executives with this type of formative experience in my 
sample, amounting to only about 1% of firm observations. The dummy variable was not 
statistically significant and had no effect on the hypothesized results, and was thus 
omitted.  
Finally, there are several examples of prominent CEOs receiving a symbolic $1 
salary; thus, I tested for the possibility that these observations may be somehow 
influencing my results. I coded for all such individuals in my dataset and completed 
analyses excluding the 7 firms where they were employed; given the low number of 
those observations, the results were nearly identical to those reported above. 
Additional Analyses 
Previous research has shown that both age and tenure tend to negatively 
influence executive risk-taking. The coefficients on average TMT age and tenure in 
some models do indeed point to this relationship; however, it also possible that these 
factors have a moderating effect on the impact of wealth on firm risk-taking. I examined 
this possibility but the interactions of average TMT wealth with average TMT age and 
average TMT tenure were not statistically significant. I also examined the possibility that 
variance in tenure, or tenure diversity, rather than average tenure moderates the effect of 
wealth on risk taking; the two-way interactions between average TMT wealth and TMT 
tenure variation were not significant for either of the outcomes, and neither was a three-
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way interaction including TMT wealth, TMT pay diversity, and TMT tenure diversity.  
I also examined whether another type of diversity – TMT heterogeneity – 
appears to influence the effect of average team wealth, especially because recent 
research suggests that TMT heterogeneity may not only affect TMT behavioral 
integration, but influence TMT pay dispersion (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 
2010). However, the interactions involving TMT heterogeneity (which simultaneously 
accounts for diversity in age, tenure, and gender) were not statistically significant. 
Additionally, I investigated whether wealth appears to have a nonlinear effect on 
the hypothesized outcomes. The squared term was not statistically significant, but this 
does not exclude the possibility that the effect of wealth levels off at some point; in fact 
the log transformation may be already capturing this effect to some degree.  
Executive external wealth and firm ownership. Next, I investigated the role of 
firm ownership as a moderator of average TMT external wealth. As evidenced in Tables 
3 and 4, the TMT average percentage of firm ownership is positively related to unrelated 
diversification and negatively related to R&D intensity. This supports the idea that 
executives indeed may view unrelated diversification as a way to diversify their personal 
portfolios to reduce their exposure to firm-specific risk (in line with the arguments in 
hypothesis 1), and are risk-averse with respect to R&D investments as a result of strong 
financial ties with the firm (in line with hypothesis 2 arguments). As shown in Table B8, 
for unrelated diversification, it appears that external wealth reduces the positive impact 
of firm ownership on the motive to engage in unrelated diversification – TMT personal 
wealth negatively moderates the effect of TMT firm ownership. In the case of R&D, 
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however, it seems that the executive financial link with the firm through stock ownership 
has a relatively stronger effect, and negatively moderates the positive effect of external 
wealth on the willingness to invest in R&D. Further theory is needed to explain why a 
certain effect predominates in each case, but this appears to be a fruitful area for future 
inquiry. 
Overall, I find a strong, robust, and consistent support for the main effect of TMT 
wealth on unrelated diversification, R&D intensity, and firm risk. Support for the 
moderating effects of within-group diversity, represented by wealth diversity and pay 
dispersion, is weak and mixed. In the next section, I discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of these results.   
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
In my dissertation, I integrate agency and upper echelons theories to develop a 
novel construct – executive external wealth – and examine its implications for 
managerial risk preferences as manifested in firm-level risk taking. Agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) highlights the misalignment of interests 
between owners and managers, which can lead executives to pursue their own private 
interests at the owners’ expense. One type of misalignment is the divergent preferences 
of executives and shareholders regarding risk. Specifically, agency theory proposes that 
because managers’ financial capital is tied to the focal firm, they will be risk averse with 
respect to firm investments, leading to suboptimal project choices from the shareholders’ 
perspective, who desire managers to invest in all beneficial prospects regardless of the 
level of risk involved. For example, managers might forgo investment in particular 
innovation projects, even if such investment would be financially desirable and preferred 
by shareholders, because they seek to limit their personal risk bearing.  
However, I develop theory to predict that executive external wealth (i.e., the 
portion of executive individual accumulated net worth that is not tied to or dependent on 
the firm) is an important contingency, and constitutes a critical predictor of managerial 
risk-taking, potentially reducing the divergence in risk preferences between executives 
and shareholders. This logic is in line with the basic premise of upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which proposes that executives act based 
70 
 
 
 
on personalized interpretations of the strategic situations they face, and as a result, 
organizations become reflections of their top management teams and their personal 
characteristics. Herein, I argue that executive external wealth changes how managers 
view firm risk and decisions involving risky projects (i.e., wealth alters their risk 
preferences by mitigating risk aversion), which will affect their strategic choices and 
ultimately manifest in firm outcomes related to risk.  
 My results strongly support the underlying premise of the theoretical model, that 
the external wealth of the upper echelon influences their strategic choices, specifically 
the riskiness of the strategic alternatives that they select to implement. In particular, I 
predict and find that average TMT wealth is negatively related to unrelated business 
diversification, and positively related to R&D investments and firm risk. As such, the 
first major theoretical contribution of this study is developing the construct of executive 
external wealth and demonstrating its relevance for agency theory’s key assumption of 
universal risk aversion. Specifically, I show that external wealth mitigates managerial 
risk aversion, adding an important contingency to this key theoretical assumption. 
A large stream of work in agency theory examines factors behind managerial 
risk-taking, with a majority of the empirical studies concentrating on the structure of 
managerial compensation (e.g., Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Larraza-
Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 
2007). Herein, I examine a complementary yet novel construct – TMT external wealth. 
My research theoretically and empirically demonstrates the importance of TMT external 
wealth for managerial risk taking, which manifests in firm outcomes. This extends the 
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normative principal–agent literature, which addresses the issue of mitigating executives’ 
risk aversion in an agency context (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). By considering the personal 
wealth of executives, we are able to arrive at a more nuanced picture of how managers 
view firm risk through the prism of their personal financial well-being. 
The second major contribution of this study is fully developing a concept 
mentioned by Hambrick and Mason (1984), which has not been investigated by 
management researchers. I thus extend upper echelons theory by developing a definition 
of the construct, discussing its boundary conditions, and developing theory on how 
executive external wealth influences managerial perceptions of firm-specific risk and 
alters the importance of other factors in managerial decision-making, such as achieving 
and maintaining a favorable reputation. I also empirically demonstrate its importance for 
top management team decisions related to risk, thereby showing its theoretical relevance 
and empirical promise for the stream of work on the upper echelons of organizations. 
Moreover, by theoretically examining two unique types of diversity—TMT wealth and 
TMT pay dispersion—this study also adds richness to the theoretical treatment of 
within-group diversity, and allows a more comprehensive empirical investigation of the 
construct. Thus, this research makes a contribution to upper echelons theory by 
developing the construct of executive external wealth and introducing wealth diversity. 
While the majority of diversity-related hypotheses do not receive support in my study, 
future research may be able to overcome the empirical challenges associated with 
measuring within-TMT diversity and the resulting upper echelon dynamics to re-
examine the relationships proposed herein. 
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Third, this work contributes important insights to the literatures on product 
diversification and innovation by showing the significance of personal wealth for these 
streams of research. Finally, the method demonstrated herein will allow other 
researchers, in management and related social science disciplines, to calculate estimates 
of executive accumulated wealth using publicly accessible data. The robustness of my 
empirical results suggests that researchers should at a minimum control for the effect of 
managerial external wealth in their future empirical models in which firm risk-taking—
both in a specific area, like R&D investments, and on a more general level—is the 
outcome of interest. 
  In the section that follows, I discuss each hypothesis and related implications 
individually. I then discuss the implications of the study as a whole, outline its 
limitations, and offer suggestions for future research. The final section concludes. 
Specific Hypotheses and Implications 
The first major empirical contribution of this study is showing that TMT external 
wealth has an important effect on the firm’s innovation strategy, as exemplified by its 
research-and-development intensity, supporting Hypothesis 1. Average personal wealth 
of the firm’s TMT members is positively related to the firm’s R&D investments, further 
supporting the premise that managerial wealth acts to mitigate managerial risk-aversion 
with respect to the firm, influences TMT strategic choices and ultimately firm outcomes.  
This finding has significant implications for the long stream of work on 
organizational innovation, which is believed to be one of the key forces in driving the 
competitive advantage or firms (Franko, 1989) and nations (Porter, 1990). Several 
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papers have focused on understanding the factors that support innovation within firms 
(e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; Hitt et 
al., 1990; 1991; 1997;  Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kor, 2006); however, this study is the first 
to address TMT personal wealth in the study of innovation. And indeed, the results 
demonstrate its importance for the firm’s level of R&D investments, which are critically 
important for (e.g., as an input to) innovation (Greve, 2003; Ahuja et al., 2008). 
Shareholders favor higher R&D investments due to the possibility of high returns 
created by a successful innovation (Hill & Snell, 1988). As such, the positive 
relationship between personal wealth and R&D investments suggest that external wealth 
helps to align managerial preferences with shareholder interests. My findings thus 
provide new insights to our understanding of the agency conflict.    
This study also provides evidence that TMT external wealth negatively 
influences unrelated business diversification, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, which speaks 
to a classic argument within the stream of work on agency theory. Amihud and Lev 
(1981), in their influential paper, provided evidence that managers, absent powerful 
monitoring (i.e., blockholders), will attempt to diversify away firm-specific risk through 
diversification. Their findings support the argument that managers view themselves as 
bearing too much firm-specific risk, and thus take strategic actions to reduce their own 
risk bearing, even if such actions are not in the best interest of shareholders. This general 
tendency of managers to favor diversification and avoid risk is further supported by
30
 
                                                          
30 
In contrast, Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) fail to find evidence that ownership and monitoring 
significantly affected firm acquisitions strategies in the 1980s. However, Boyd, Gove, and Hitt (2005) find 
that after correcting for measurement error in Lane et al.’s study, strong governance indeed limits 
unrelated diversification, confirming the original conclusion of Amihud and Lev. 
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Hill and Snell (1988) and Hill and Snell (1989). However, no study until now has 
examined both managerial firm ownership, which can be viewed as the portion of 
manager’s wealth that is tied to the firm, and managerial external wealth simultaneously. 
I find that TMT equity ownership in the firm has a positive effect on unrelated 
diversification, in line with the agency theory logic. But more importantly, I also find 
that TMT external wealth has a negative effect on unrelated diversification. This shows 
that personal wealth not only has a significant effect on a key firm strategy, product 
diversification, but—in this context—acts to align managerial interests with shareholder 
interests. Moreover, additional analysis shows that external wealth appears to reduce 
(i.e., negatively moderate) the effect of focal firm ownership, which reflects managerial 
risk bearing, on the motive to diversify the firm. This suggests that external wealth 
provides a better means of diversifying the manager’s personal portfolio, which provides 
an important contingency to one of agency theory’s key predictions. 
The third finding of this study is that TMT external wealth has an important 
effect on firm risk, supporting Hypothesis 3. This result directly contributes to the 
normative principal-agent literature, which addresses the optimal design of 
compensation contracts and other structures with the goal of mitigating the risk aversion 
of executives (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). The results support the contention that as 
managerial personal wealth increases, executives become “increasingly less risk averse” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 62), demonstrating that external wealth helps to overcome managerial 
risk aversion regarding firm strategies, thus creating greater alignment between owners 
and managers. This is important because it suggests that without considering executive 
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external wealth, compensation contracts designed around agency theory predictions may 
be not only inefficient (Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2003), but could be overly effective in 
encouraging risk-taking. Specifically, if wealthy managers are given option-heavy 
compensation contracts (with high pay–firm risk sensitivity), they may be inclined to 
take on a more than optimal amount of risk, because external wealth limits risk aversion 
while pay incentives are generally designed to encourage greater risk-taking. Thus, if 
boards of directors were legally able to consider executives’ external wealth, they may 
want to give wealthier managers lower pay incentives to take risk. Moreover, because of 
lower risk aversion and lower relative risk bearing (as a result of personal 
diversification), wealthier managers will also discount incentive/long-term compensation 
less, leading them to require lower total pay.
31
 This would make it is relatively less 
expensive to issue option compensation to wealthy managers. These two issues – 
adjusting pay–risk sensitivity and accounting for the lower relative cost of option 
compensation – merit consideration by compensation committees.  
Hypotheses 4a-c, concerning the predicted negative moderating effect of TMT 
wealth diversity on the relationship between average TMT wealth and (a) R&D 
intensity, (b) unrelated diversification, and (c) firm risk received no empirical support. 
First, I fail to find supporting evidence that TMT wealth diversity decreases the 
influence of average TMT wealth on the firm’s unrelated diversification strategy 
(Hypothesis 4b) or on firm risk (Hypothesis 4c). There are several potential 
                                                          
31
 Assuming that two managers who differ only on external wealth are paid solely in options, the relatively 
less wealthy manager, who is less diversified, will require a greater total amount of pay compared to the 
wealthier manager. This is because the less wealthy manager will need to be compensated for the greater 
degree of firm risk bearing. 
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reasons/explanations for the insignificant results, both empirical and theoretical. On the 
empirical front, there is no precise measure of wealth diversity available that would suit 
the purposes of this study. Because I predict the moderating effects of within-group 
differences in wealth based on assumed decision disagreement, or task conflict (Jehn, 
1997), the measure used should serve as an effective proxy for task-related disagreement 
brought about by wealth differences. Available measures, such as the standard deviation 
of wealth or the Gini coefficient of wealth within the team, are not precise enough to 
determine the exact level of disagreement likely to occur. These represent coarse-grained 
proxies at best. For example, disagreement resulting from one person having very 
different wealth from the rest of the team is likely to have a divergent effect from the 
level of disagreement as a result of two or three people having somewhat different 
wealth; however, the measures of diversity available in extant literature may classify the 
aforementioned examples as having (numerically) the same level of diversity. 
Specifically, one person having much greater wealth may be very vocal about their 
objections, but they may be easily overruled; when a few people have different wealth 
from the rest of the group, they may be able to sway the final decision. These 
measurement challenges have not yet been overcome in the stream of research on group 
diversity (please see DeRue et al., 2010).  
On a theoretical level, it may be that wealth diversity needs to reach a certain 
level before it affects task conflict thereby altering the effect of average TMT wealth. If 
that is the case, wealth diversity is best conceptualized (and should be statistically 
modeled) as a threshold variable – it has the ability to alter the main relationship only 
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once a certain threshold is met. Such threshold effects are not uncommon and have been 
modeled in a host of other disciplines, including economics (e.g., Bick, 2010; Jude, 
2010; Papageorgiou, 2002), finance (e.g., Marcucci & Quagliariello, 2009; Narayan & 
Sharma, 2011), and epidemiology (e.g., Samia, Chan, & Stenseth 2007; Samia et al., 
2011), among others.
32
  
Another potential reason behind the insignificant moderation results may be that 
once individuals reach a certain level of wealth, differences in wealth between 
individuals do not matter much – once each member of the TMT reaches a reasonable 
standard of financial security and is able to diversify his/her holdings, the effect of 
average wealth does not change and is resistant to variation in wealth between TMT 
members. For example, current estimates suggest that the difference in wealth between 
Bill Gates and Warren Buffet is substantially large in dollar terms; however, this 
difference is unlikely to cause a conflict in their joint decision making, because they 
have both achieved financial security (and are, in fact, attempting to give away their 
wealth rather than acquire it). These possibilities present opportunities for future 
research. 
Surprisingly, the empirical evidence is opposite to the prediction of Hypothesis 
4a – wealth diversity positively‒‒instead of negatively‒‒moderates the relationship 
between average TMT wealth and the firm’s R&D intensity. This unexpected finding 
may be driven by the fact that decisions about R&D investments—compared to the 
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 A block-diagonal regression indicates that average wealth may indeed affect unrelated diversification 
and firm risk differently at higher levels of wealth diversity. When diversity is high, the wealth 
coefficients get smaller (closer to zero), suggesting negative moderation in line with the predictions, but 
the differences are not statistically significant in my sample. The application of more nuanced statistical 
techniques may be necessary to provide a better test of these relationships.  
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firm’s diversification posture or other major corporate decisions that affect the firm’s 
overall risk profile—are more likely to be influenced by a small number of individuals 
or even a single individual (e.g., the firm’s Chief Technology Officer or the Vice 
President of Product Development).
33
 If these individuals have very high wealth vis-à-
vis the rest of the team (which could potentially result in both higher average wealth and 
higher wealth diversity) and select a high R&D investment strategy, the resulting 
outcome might suggest a positive and significant interaction. However, in this case, the 
two are mechanically related. In other words, it is likely that decisions about R&D are 
more easily swayed by a smaller group than decisions about unrelated diversification 
(which is a more general strategic move) and, especially, firm risk (which is influenced 
by a collection of many individual decisions).
34
 While not anticipated, this finding 
suggests that wealth diversity may matter differently for different firm outcomes, but 
further theory and empirical examination is needed to explore this perspective. 
Hypotheses 5a-c, predicting a negative moderating effect of TMT pay dispersion 
on the relationship between average TMT wealth and (a) R&D intensity, (b) unrelated 
diversification, and (c) firm risk, received mixed support. Hypothesis 5b was supported; 
thus, another contribution of this study is showing that pay dispersion reduces the effect 
of a novel team characteristic (i.e., average TMT wealth) on the firm’s unrelated 
diversification posture. The finding that the degree to which individual wealth matters to 
a major strategic decision (i.e., business diversification) is to some extent contingent on 
                                                          
33
 Execucomp provides information on the five highest paid officers of the firm, regardless of their title. 
34
 There is no single “firm risk decision,” as it is influenced by a large number of factors and individual 
decisions. 
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the distribution of pay within the team is in line with previous research, which 
unambiguously suggests that pay dispersion tends to reduce cooperation and promote 
personal conflict within the group in major strategic decisions. The results of this study 
imply that this greater conflict attenuates the effect of average TMT wealth on the firm’s 
unrelated diversification posture.  
Hypotheses 5a and 5c however, which predicted a similar attenuating effect of 
pay dispersion on the TMT wealth‒R&D intensity and TMT wealth‒firm risk 
relationship respectively, did not receive support. A potential explanation is that while 
diversification decisions are more likely to involve several team members, R&D 
investments decisions are more easily controlled by a smaller group of people (as 
discussed above) or even made at a lower management level. In that situation, 
relationship conflict would not necessarily be as detrimental to team dynamics. Firm 
risk, on the other hand, reflects an aggregate of many individual decisions over the 
course of the year, other than just decisions with clear risk implications, such as R&D 
investments or diversification. Thus, relationship conflict may not manifest itself 
empirically, because while diversification decisions likely involve multiple top managers 
(i.e., relationship conflict is likely to be important), firm risk reflects a collection of 
individual decisions, some of which may have been made by a single individual, and 
others as a group. In other words, it would be difficult to predict how relationship 
conflict impacts each decision that may influence firm risk. There is no “firm risk 
decision,” which might help to explain why within-team variance in pay does little to 
attenuate the effect of average TMT wealth.    
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General Implications 
On a more general level, this study offers several theoretical and practical 
implications. First, it introduces a novel construct and documents its influence on 
executive risk aversion with respect to the firm, directly contributing to the normative 
stream of agency theory, which seeks to understand what influences executive 
willingness to bear firm-specific risk. Greater willingness to bear risk is central to 
helping mitigate the agency problem, as it brings managers in greater alignment with 
shareholders; as such, this study shows how executive wealth helps generate greater 
alignment. This study also highlights the differential effects of wealth that is tied to the 
firm, through stock ownership and current year compensation, and personal wealth that 
is independent of the firm. Extant agency theory and governance research tend to refer to 
and treat wealth as a very broad construct, meaning executive financial well-being, and 
mostly in the context of current and future compensation. However, I show that the 
consideration of executive accumulated wealth as a result of past compensation has a 
significant effect on their decisions above and beyond that of current compensation. 
Second, this study introduces the construct of personal wealth to the study of 
upper echelons, which‒‒as both the theory and the results suggest‒‒has an important 
influence on executive preferences. The addition of this construct to the well-established 
ones within this stream of research, such as executive gender, tenure, or functional 
background, can help generate new insights into what personal characteristics matter for 
different firm outcomes. For example, the accumulation of personal wealth might have 
divergent effects on executives depending on their gender or socioeconomic background. 
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It is also possible that past studies regarding the effects of executive tenure on firm 
performance provide an incomplete picture, because they do not include estimates of 
executive wealth, and the two are likely to be positively related.  
 While the two aforementioned theories form the core of this research, the 
findings also have implications for other prominent theories where risk plays a key role. 
For example, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposes that individuals 
weigh outcomes differently depending on whether they are facing (or believe they are 
facing) sure gains or sure losses. When faced with a choice between a sure loss or a 
larger but uncertain loss, most people will accept the risk of a larger loss in the hope of 
avoiding a loss altogether. On the other hand, when faced with a sure gain or a larger but 
uncertain gain, most people choose a “bird in the hand.” People are thus risk seeking 
when facing the prospect of losses, but loss averse when facing the prospect of gains. 
The stream of empirical research in prospect theory, and the related behavioral agency 
theory (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), confirms these general tendencies; however, 
extant research does not explicitly include the individual’s accumulated wealth into 
consideration, which may alter some decision choices.  
 Prospect theory is similar to expected utility theory in that it assumes diminishing 
marginal sensitivity, or lower subjective value, of gains and losses as individuals get 
farther away from their reference point (Kahneman, 2012). Moreover, Kahneman (2012) 
notes that in mixed outcome “gambles,” where both gains and losses are possible, 
individuals are strongly risk averse. As Holmes and colleagues (2011: 1093) highlight, 
“many decisions in organizations constitute mixed gambles,” as “most risky business 
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choices (e.g., acquisitions or new product introductions) can have positive or negative 
outcomes.” Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualize any business decision involving risk 
where a loss is not even a possibility. Thus, prospect theory predicts that executives will 
be risk averse and avoid taking risk in many organizational decisions (instead of taking 
the chance of a better but uncertain outcome). However, if we assume that the minimum 
wealth needed for financial security constitutes a reference point for many executives, as 
they move farther away from that point, they will be less subject to loss aversion and 
more willing to take greater risk. Specifically, having a substantial amount of 
accumulated wealth may change how an individual views future losses – if individuals 
are high above the point of financial security, losses will not seem as detrimental to their 
future wealth; conversely, however, gains may also be perceived differently because of 
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. In fact, scholars recently suggested that 
“research should consider the possibility that the value function varies across 
individuals,” as past experimental studies that attempted to better define the form and 
shape of the value function for different individuals nearly exclusively relied on small 
monetary gambles in lab settings with university students (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, 
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011: 1093). Wealth may be one salient characteristic that 
impacts the value function for individuals, and the inclusion of this characteristic in 
future prospect theory studies provides an opportunity to extend this line of research. 
This study also offers important practical implications. First, it shows that TMT 
wealth has a significant effect on the decision to invest in R&D, the key input to the 
firm’s innovation process (Ahuja et al., 2008). Given increasing technological intensity 
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in many industries and the blurring of industry boundaries (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 
2010), both of which require top managers to continuously invest in R&D and develop 
their firms’ technological capabilities, this finding is important to consider by boards of 
directors. Prevailing practice is to issue managers contingent compensation, especially 
stock options, in an attempt to encourage risk-taking, including the risk inherent in R&D 
projects. My findings suggest that financial security in the form of private (non-firm) 
wealth can help to achieve that objective; thus, boards should weigh the pros and cons of 
“at risk” pay, especially because stock options have been found to produce several 
unintended deleterious outcomes, including excessive risk-taking (e.g., O'Connor Jr. et 
al., 2006; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Zhang et al., 2008). While investments in R&D 
are crucial to firm competitive advantage and long-term survival, especially in high 
technology settings (Ahuja et al., 2008; Sundaram, John, & John, 1996), research shows 
that extreme risk-taking is more likely to produce big losses rather than big gains 
(Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). At a minimum then, boards should try to take the 
executive’s personal wealth into consideration when determining the structure of his/her 
compensation package, especially the sensitivity of their pay to firm risk. Moreover, 
while a multitude of factors come into consideration when hiring a new top executive, to 
the extent that the law would allow considering executive wealth in the selection 
process, this study suggests that wealthier executives‒‒all else equal‒‒will be relatively 
less risk averse compared to their less wealthy counterparts. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has certain limitations, perhaps the most important of which is the 
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inability to directly assess the exact personal wealth of each executive. This information 
is not publicly available, and I must rely on public reports of past compensation received 
by each executive. Nevertheless, my measure is a conservative, lower-bound estimate of 
the magnitude of each executive’s true personal wealth, which means that the findings 
may only underestimate the wealth effect. Moreover, as discussed above, my measures 
of wealth diversity present several empirical challenges, some of which could be 
overcome in future research, either as a result of future methodological developments or 
through the use of survey-based measures.  
The setting of the study‒‒large, publicly-traded firms‒‒while appropriate to test 
agency theory arguments, also somewhat limits the generalizability of the results. It is 
not certain that the results would hold in small enterprises, where the pursuit of financial 
wealth may sometimes be secondary to other considerations, such as maintaining and 
cultivating strong social relationships. Moreover, my sample is comprised solely of U.S.-
based firms, which raises the question of whether these relationships hold or are 
somewhat altered in other country contexts. For example, it is possible that in countries 
with strong collectivist cultures (such as Colombia, Taiwan or China), personal wealth 
and associated financial security is perceived differently, as individuals are expected to 
share their resources with their extended families and even communities; in those 
cultures, financial security (or lack thereof) may be evaluated in a much broader setting.  
 The construct of executive wealth offers many opportunities for future research. 
One area where the importance of managerial preferences and values is very salient is 
corporate social performance – “a business organization's configuration of principles of 
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social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and 
observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships” (Wood, 1991: 
693).   The majority of research on corporate social performance is grounded in 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 1983), which proposes that 
corporate managers need to devote attention to multiple groups of the firm’s 
stakeholders, including but not limited to its shareholders. Highlighting this focus on 
stakeholders, scholars recommend evaluating corporate social performance based on the 
firm’s management of its relationship with its stakeholders (c.f. Clarkson, 1995). There 
are reasons to expect that executive wealth may influence corporate social performance. 
First, stakeholder-focused initiatives are more likely to pay off in the long run, and 
stock-based financial incentives may encourage managers to pursue short-term stock 
price increases at the expense of social performance (McGuire, Dow, & Argheyd, 2003). 
Second, studies suggest that taking multiple stakeholder interests into consideration may 
jeopardize the managers’ future income streams, as reflected in lower salaries and pay 
increases (Coombs & Gilley, 2005). However, higher personal wealth is expected to 
reduce the importance of current financial incentives (Gerhart et al., 2009), making the 
pursuit of financial rewards relatively less important, and conversely, the pursuit of 
stakeholder interests more appealing. It is also likely that as personal wealth increases, 
other concerns‒‒such as a favorable reputation and managing a firm known for socially 
responsible initiatives‒‒become more prominent. 
In a related vein, future research could examine the moderating effect of wealth 
on executive financial incentives. Somewhat surprisingly, “almost no literature examines 
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executive characteristics and compensation in tandem, or their interactive effects in 
shaping company outcomes” (Hambrick, 2007: 339-340).  As noted by Gerhart et al. 
(2009), individual differences between executives and the resulting motivational effects 
of incentive compensation are yet to receive research attention. Importantly, Gerhart and 
colleagues (2009: 290; emphasis added)  highlight that “depending on such variables as 
time to retirement, previously accumulated equity in the firm, and other personal wealth, 
executives may theoretically value the marginal stock and option compensation they 
receive differently.” In particular, as executives’ personal wealth increases, the incentive 
effect of their firm-specific option holdings decreases, because they represent a smaller 
part of their total wealth portfolio (which includes current and future firm compensation, 
as well as the personal wealth portion). As such, average TMT personal wealth should 
decrease the well-documented positive effect of stock option incentives on firm risk 
taking (e.g., Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & 
Pettus, 2007), as well as other related outcomes, including financial restatements (e.g., 
Burns & Kedia, 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Kedia & Philippon, 2009) and 
corporate fraud (Denis, Hanouna, & Sarin, 2006). 
The results for within-group diversity in this study, both wealth diversity and pay 
disparity, were weak. However, in addition to the possibilities discussed above, such as 
non-linear and threshold effects, it may be fruitful to examine wealth differences as part 
of a broader range of characteristics. For example, future studies could examine whether 
personal wealth helps create stronger team faultlines, which are “hypothetical dividing 
lines that split a team into relatively homogeneous subgroups based on the team 
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members’ demographic alignment along multiple attributes” (Thatcher & Patel, 2011: 
1119). A recent meta-analysis shows that faultline strength is positively related to both 
task conflict and relationship conflict, and negatively related to team cohesion; thus it 
appears that demographic faultlines are important to the key upper echelons construct of 
behavioral integration (Hambrick, 1994; 1995), and it is possible that wealth differences 
affect TMT dynamics through their influence on faultline formation and strength, as 
opposed to in a direct manner. 
Another potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine the 
effects of personal wealth in a family firm context. The key difference between family 
and nonfamily firms is the role of noneconomic factors in the management of the firm 
(Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). Gomez-Mejia and colleagues 
labeled all the noneconomic utilities (or “affective endowments”) received by family 
principals‒‒including organizational identity, pride in managing a family firm, 
maintaining a good family name, the ability to exercise authority and control over 
business processes, the preservation of family dynasty, and others‒‒as an all-
encompassing construct of socioemotional wealth or SEW (Gomez-Mejia, Takacs 
Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Many managerial choices 
in family firms are driven, or at least influenced by, a socioemotional wealth 
preservation motive (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). In the case of managers who are also 
family members, personal financial wealth and family wealth may often be intertwined; 
moreover, SEW also plays an important role in managerial decision-making. This raises 
the question, how do personal financial wealth and SEW together affect firm strategic 
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choices? Extant research suggests that SEW preservation leads family firms to be more 
risk-averse compared to their nonfamily counterparts (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010; 
2011), but findings reported in this study indicate that external wealth helps to mitigate 
managerial risk aversion; thus, examining the competing influences of SEW and 
personal wealth in a single study presents an excellent opportunity for future research. 
The results of this study indirectly suggest that, in addition to shareholders, 
managerial external wealth may have important implications for firm bondholders. The 
two groups of stakeholders are similar in that they are both key suppliers of the firm’s 
external capital. Despite these similarities, multiple scholars highlight the 
shareholder‒bondholder conflict in agency theory (e.g., Black & Cox, 1976; DeFusco, 
Johnson, & Zorn, 1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Myers, 
1977; Subramaniam, 1998). Shareholders are assumed to be risk neutral with respect to 
firm-specific risk because of their ability to diversify their holdings among a portfolio of 
firms; as such, they prefer managers to take all beneficial risks (i.e., positive NPV 
projects, even risky ones). Bondholders, on the other hand, only have a fixed claim – 
they thus bear the costs of increases in firm risk (such as greater possibility of firm 
liquidation in bankruptcy), but do not enjoy any of the benefits (such as the higher 
possible returns available to shareholders). Because of this, the value of the bondholders’ 
claims generally declines with increases in firm risk. It may then be that higher external 
wealth produces greater alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests, while 
simultaneously reducing the degree of alignment between managers’ and bondholders’ 
interests. While much of the agency literature focuses on the two-way 
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shareholder‒manager (and sometimes bondholder‒manager) agency conflict, recent 
studies highlight the importance of considering the interaction among shareholders, 
bondholders, and managers (e.g., Chava, Kumar, & Warga, 2010). In fact, recent 
research suggests that although shareholders’ and bondholders’ desires usually conflict, 
in some circumstances the interests of shareholders and bondholders are aligned 
(Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). Although a full investigation 
of the impact of TMT external wealth on bondholder value is beyond the scope of this 
study, it presents an excellent opportunity for future research.  
 The construct of personal wealth can also be easily extended to non-executive 
employees in the organization and find application in the ‘micro’ area of management. 
One area of research where the consideration of personal wealth may significantly 
influence prior findings is research in the area of justice, and especially distributive 
justice. The majority of research on distributive justice is grounded in equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), which proposes that individuals compare their own inputs (e.g., 
seniority, effort) and outcomes (e.g., pay, other work benefits) to the inputs and 
outcomes of a “referent other” - a different person who is similar to the individual on 
one or more attributes (e.g., coworkers), a past self, or future self. If these ratios are 
perceived as roughly equal, then equity exists and the individual is satisfied. Unequal 
ratios, however, create inequity, tension, and dissatisfaction. While equity theory was at 
first generally described and applied as a type of motivational theory, research in the 
1990s expanded in its application of equity theory to a broader range of employee 
attitudes and behaviors (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999). Extensive literature suggests that 
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employees form fairness perceptions associated with their own outcomes and that these 
perceptions influence their attitudes and behaviors (please see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001, and Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, for reviews).  
 The individual’s current wealth may either influence his/her justice perceptions 
directly (for example, by influencing how much weight individuals assign to their own 
outcomes versus the outcomes of others), or may moderate the relationship between 
justice perceptions and related attitudes/actions (such as job satisfaction, withdrawal, job 
effort, organizational citizenship behaviors, and stealing). Understanding the effect of 
wealth on justice perceptions within top management teams may be important, as those 
individuals tend to be achievement-oriented and concerned with how their own pay 
compares with the pay of their team members (Fredrickson et al., 2010). In other words, 
executives are likely to view other top managers on their team as their comparison others 
(Fredrickson et al., 2010). However, studying the effects of wealth on justice outside of 
the top executive context also seems promising, especially given the fact that the 
‘comparison other’ can be a version of the self – either a “past self” (based on the 
individual’s past) or “future self” (based on what the individual aspires to). Factoring in 
the effect of current wealth and either past or future (aspiration-level) wealth can lead to 
interesting new insights. If wealth has a direct effect on individual justice perceptions, 
then we would expect wealth to decrease perceived inequity in the presence of the same 
input/output ratios; put differently, personal wealth may “equalize” the comparison 
equation. If wealth has a more indirect effect, it is possible that wealthier individuals do 
not respond to perceived inequity as strongly, while relatively ‘poor’ individuals‒‒for 
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whom attaining greater financial security could be particularly salient‒‒may be very 
sensitive to inequity and distributive justice perceptions. Of course it is also possible that 
both the direct and indirect effect of wealth is found in this context.  
 Another area of research in which the consideration of external financial wealth 
may play an important role is the specific outcome of individual motivation, especially 
in the context of lower-level employees. Work motivation can be defined as “internal 
and external forces that initiate work-related behavior, and determine its form, direction, 
intensity, and duration” (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999: 231). This definition underscores the 
fact that that both internal (i.e., intrinsic motivation) and external (i.e., extrinsic 
motivation) factors contribute to work-related effort. At higher levels of wealth, the 
marginal utility of an additional dollar decreases; thus, other motivators are likely to 
become more important. Once a person attains relative financial security, he or she is 
more likely to emphasize other objectives and be driven by different forces. For 
example, wealthier individuals in the workforce may be driven by intrinsic motivation, 
or the “motivation to perform an activity for itself, in order to experience the pleasure 
and satisfaction inherent in the activity” (Van Yperen & Hageoorn, 2003: 340), more 
than external motivation as a result of financial incentives. Current wealth may thus also 
impact the incidence of (new) job search by currently employed individuals, as they seek 
to find employment that brings them fulfillment rather than employment as a source of 
income. Surprisingly, “although job factors (e.g., compensation, job demands) and 
perceptions of such factors (e.g., equity, job satisfaction) are commonly examined” in 
the literature on employed job seekers (Boswell, Zimmerman, & Swider, 2011: 150), the 
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role of financial need has only been applied to the context of unemployed job seekers 
and in job loss contexts. As such, future research can examine the impact of personal 
wealth on both voluntary job turnover and subsequent job selection. 
 Additionally, personal wealth has the potential to influence a host of other 
outcomes. For instance, wealth or lack thereof can have a profound impact on the 
individual’s stress levels and job burnout (for reviews, please see Cordes & Dougherty, 
1993; Lee & Ashforth, 1996; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001), depression (Lorant, 
Deliège, Eaton, Robert,  Philippot, & Ansseau, 2003), and overall health (Adams, Hurd, 
McFadden, Merrill, & Ribeiro, 2003), all of which can influence work outcomes.  
Conclusion 
 This research builds on and extends agency and upper echelons theories by 
developing the construct of executive external (personal) wealth. I investigate the effect 
of average external wealth of the top management team (TMT) on firm strategic choices 
with respect to risk, and find strong evidence that wealthier TMTs are less risk averse 
with respect to firm strategic decisions. However, I fail to find support for the majority 
of the predicted moderating effects of wealth and pay diversity. Overall, the effect of 
wealth appears very robust and consistent across the different outcomes under 
consideration, which has significant implications for both agency and upper echelons 
theories as well as the streams of research on innovation and business diversification. 
The novelty of this construct as well as its relevance for many theories and areas in 
management presents multiple opportunities for future research.    
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TABLE B1 
Marginal Individual Tax Rates and Rates of Return Used to Estimate CEO Wealth   
 
Year Marginal  
Tax Rate (%) 
Market Rate 
of Return 
Risk-free Rate  
of Return 
1992 31.0 0.0446 0.0643 
1993 39.6 0.0706 0.0553 
1994 39.6     -0.0154 0.0784 
1995 39.6 0.3411 0.0549 
1996 39.6 0.2026 0.0634 
1997 39.6 0.3101 0.0577 
1998 39.6 0.2667 0.0473 
1999 39.6 0.1953 0.0655 
2000 39.6     -0.1014 0.0516 
2001 39.1     -0.1304 0.0484 
2002 38.6     -0.2337 0.0336 
2003 35.0 0.2638 0.0377 
2004 35.0 0.0899 0.0394 
2005 35.0 0.0300 0.0436 
2006 35.0 0.1362 0.0470 
2007 35.0 0.0353 0.0370 
2008 35.0 -0.3849 0.0187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
1
1
9
 
TABLE B2  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Unrelated diversif. 0.212 0.338
2. R&D intensity 0.062 0.897 -0.03
3. Firm risk 0.001 0.001 -0.13 0.10
4. Avg. TMT wealth
a 
2.83 4.27 0.09 -0.03 -0.01
5. Wealth diversity 0 0.059 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.29
6. Pay dispersion 0 0.057 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.24 0.24
7. Firm size      21.74 1.71 0.20 -0.10 -0.33 0.51 0.08 0.18
8. Stock return 0.153 0.667 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06
9. Free cash flow  582.2 1671.5 0.17 -0.02 -0.16 0.30 0.06 0.09 0.53 -0.01
10. Duality 0.65 0.48 0.14 -0.04 -0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.05
11. Board size 9.67 2.76 0.17 -0.16 -0.26 0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.61 0.00 0.36
12. Outside director % 0.79 0.11 0.13 -0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.10
13. Outsider ownership 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.07
14. Institution ownership 0.67 0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.24 0.09 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06
15. TMT heterogeneity 1.24 0.30 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.03
16. TMT avg. tenure 9.64 5.26 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.25 -0.07 -0.16 -0.06 0.00 0.06
17. TMT avg. age 55.76 6.03 0.14 -0.04 -0.10 0.18 0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.00 0.11
18. TMT avg. % owned 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.20 0.01 -0.06
19. TMT avg. $ owned 132.3 3702.3 0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.18
20. Avg. total pay(log) 0.61 1.0 0.11 -0.02 -0.09 0.53 0.14 0.33 0.47 -0.01 0.37  
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
1
2
0
 
TABLE B2 - Continued 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
11. Board size 0.05
12. Outside director % 0.14 0.26
13. Outsider ownership -0.05 0.05 0.06
14. Institution ownership 0.00 -0.20 0.05 -0.03
15. TMT heterogeneity -0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.01
16. TMT avg. tenure -0.06 -0.07 -0.27 -0.05 0.06 0.09
17. TMT avg. age 0.10 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.19
18. TMT avg. % owned -0.01 -0.19 -0.33 0.11 -0.21 0.01 0.24 0.13
19. TMT avg. $ owned 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.04
20. Avg. total pay(log) 0.08 0.20 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.01  
    All values equal to or greater than the absolute value of .02 are statistically significant at α=.05 level 
   a
 In millions; mean and standard deviation based on raw data; correlations based on the log-transformed version used                                         
 in regressions. 
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TABLE B3  
Panel Tobit Regressions for R&D Intensityt+1 
 
 Model 1: 
Control 
Model 2:  
Main effect 
Model 3:            
Full model 
Firm size -0.042 *** -0.055 *** -0.054 *** 
Stock return -0.015 * -0.014 * -0.014 * 
Free cash flow 0.000 0.000  0.000  
Duality 0.006 0.005 0.004 
Board size -0.007 * -0.006 * -0.007 * 
% outsider directors 0.034 0.054 0.068 
Outsider ownership 0.055 0.035 0.033 
Institutional ownership -0.034 -0.053 -0.055 
TMT heterogeneity -0.006  -0.008 -0.009  
Average tenure -0.002  -0.004 * -0.004 * 
Average age -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
Average % ownership 
 
 
-0.959 ** -0.854 * -0.888 ** 
Average $ owned 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Avg. total compensation 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.239 ** 0.153 + 0.052  
 dispersion 0.044 0.025  0.031  
Average TMT wealth    0.039 *** 0.040 *** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
 
  
  0.186 * 
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
    -0.011  
Constant 0.917 ** 1.235 *** 1.219 *** 
Log-likelihood 285.88  293.01  296.19  
Wald χ2 90.52 *** 106.70 *** 113.25 *** 
χ 2 DF   21  22  24  
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N 2199  2199  2199  
Year dummies are included in all specifications.    
  +p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE B4  
Panel Tobit Regressions for Unrelated Diversificationt+1 
 
 Model 1: 
Control 
Model 2:  
Main effect 
Model 3:            
Full model 
Firm size  0.093 *** 0.119 *** 0.126 *** 
Stock return  -0.006  -0.009  -0.009  
Free cash flow -0.000 0.000  0.000  
Duality 0.025 + 0.022 0.024 + 
Board size 0.005 0.005  0.004  
% outsider directors 0.056 0.021  0.013  
Outsider ownership -0.284 -0.252  -0.231  
Institutional ownership -0.029 0.003  0.013  
TMT heterogeneity -0.042  -0.033  -0.040  
Average tenure -0.006 ** -0.000  0.001  
Average age 0.001  0.002  0.002  
Average % ownership 
 
 
1.615 *** 1.370 ** 1.276 ** 
Average $ owned -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
Avg. total compensation 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.136  0.295 * 0.204  
 dispersion -0.242 * -0.189  -0.245 * 
Average TMT wealth    -0.086 *** -0.095 *** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
 
  
  
0.147 
 
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
    
0.293 * 
Constant -2.316 *** -3.025 *** -3.160 *** 
Log-likelihood -351.44  -343.99  -340.16  
Wald χ2 136.33 *** 168.61 *** 177.05 *** 
χ 2 DF   21  22  24  
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N 2193  2193  2193  
Year dummies are included in all specifications.    
  +p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE B5  
Fixed Effect Regressions for Firm Riskt+1 
 
 Model 1: 
Control 
Model 2:  
Main effect 
Model 3:            
Full model 
Firm size 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 
Stock return -0.008 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** 
Free cash flow -0.000 * -0.000 * -0.000 * 
Duality 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Board size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% outsider directors 0.002 0.005 0.004 
Outsider ownership -0.025 -0.028 -0.027 
Institutional ownership -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
TMT heterogeneity 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  
Average tenure 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Average age 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
Average % ownership 
 
 
-0.139 + -0.124 -0.122 
Average $ owned 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Avg. total compensation 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.008  -0.004  -0.010  
 dispersion 0.013 0.011  0.009  
Average TMT wealth    0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
 
  
  -0.021  
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
    
0.003 
 
Constant -0.487 ** -0.404 *** -0.403 *** 
F 42.97 *** 40.93 *** 37.54 *** 
DF 21  22  24  
Adj. R
2
(w. firm effects) 0.71  0.72  0.72  
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N 2256  2256  2256  
Firm (gvkey) and year dummies are included in all specifications.    
  +p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE B6  
Panel Tobit Regressions for R&D Intensityt+1 and Unrelated Diversificationt+1  
using Ratio Measure of Wealth 
 
 R&D: 
Main effect 
R&D: 
Full model 
Unrelated div.: 
Main effect 
Unrelated div.:  
Full model 
Firm size -0.027 *** -0.026 *** 0.106 *** 0.112 *** 
Stock return -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.010  -0.009  
Free cash flow 0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
Duality 0.005  0.004 
 
0.021  0.024 + 
Board size -0.003 * -0.003 * 0.004  0.004  
% outsider directors 0.048 + 0.048 + 0.042  0.036  
Outsider ownership 0.008  0.007  -0.265  -0.249  
Institutional ownership -0.002  -0.003  -0.010  0.000  
TMT heterogeneity -0.000  -0.000  -0.036  -0.044  
Average tenure -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.003  -0.002  
Average age -0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.002  
Average % ownership 
 
 
-0.267 + -0.263 + 1.204  ** 1.177 ** 
Avg. total comp. -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.102 * 0.089 * 0.238  + 0.221  
dispersion 0.026 0.038 -0.196 + -0.261 * 
Avg. TMT wealth (R) 0.201 *** 0.189 *** -0.476 *** -0.569 *** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
  
 0.007 
+ 
 
 
0.010  
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
  
-0.378   
 
2.420 
* 
Constant 0.550 *** 0.545 *** -2.672 *** -2.790 *** 
Log-likelihood 904.97  906.32  -348.02  -345.14  
Wald χ2 116.80 *** 120.42 *** -145.91 *** -152.33 *** 
χ 2 DF   22  24  22  24  
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N 2199  2199  2193  2193  
 Year dummies are included in all specifications.    
   +p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE B7  
Fixed Effect Regressions for Firm Risk t+1 using Ratio Measure of Wealth 
  
 Model 1: 
Control 
Model 2:  
Main effect 
Model 3:            
Full model 
Firm size 0.024  *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 
Stock return -0.008 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** 
Free cash flow -0.000 * -0.000 * -0.000 * 
Duality 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Board size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% outsider directors 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Outsider ownership -0.025 -0.028 -0.029 
Institutional ownership -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
TMT heterogeneity 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  
Average tenure 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Average age 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
Average % ownership 
 
 
-0.111 + -0.095 -0.092 
Avg. total compensation 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.007  -0.008  -0.014  
 dispersion 0.014 0.008  0.010  
Avg. TMT wealth (R)   0.094 *** 0.088 ** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
 
    
0.002 
 
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
    -0.054  
Constant -0.490 ** -0.383 *** -0.376 *** 
F 44.96 *** 42.88 *** 39.98 *** 
DF 20  21  24  
Adj. R
2
(w. firm effects) 0.71  0.72  0.72  
N 2256  2256  2256  
Firm (gvkey) and year dummies are included in all specifications.    
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TABLE B8  
Panel Tobit Regressions for Unrelated Diversificationt+1 and R&D Intensityt+1 –  
the Interactions of Average External Wealth and Firm Ownership 
 
 Unrelated div.:  
Model 1 
Unrelated div.:  
Model 2 
R&D:  
Model 1 
R&D :  
Model 2 
Firm size 0.122 *** 0.120  *** -0.055 *** -0.056  *** 
Stock return -0.010  -0.010 -0.014 * -0.013 + 
Free cash flow 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Duality 0.025 + 0.023 0.004  0.005 
Board size 0.005  0.006 -0.007 * -0.007 * 
% outsider directors 0.012  0.044 0.070  0.075 
Outsider ownership -0.236  -0.256 0.018  0.002 
Institutional owner’p 0.007  0.021 -0.058 + -0.055 
TMT heterogeneity -0.036  -0.033  -0.008  -0.009  
Average tenure 0.001  0.001  -0.004 * -0.003 * 
Average age 0.002  0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
Average % 
ownership 
 
1.165 ** 0.919  * -0.844 * -1.406 ** 
Average $ owned -0.000 -0.000  0.000  0.000 
Avg. total comp. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth diversity 
Pay  
0.187  0.205  0.047  0.052  
dispersion -0.191  -0.201  + 0.024  0.020  
Average TMT wealth  -0.090 *** -0.092 *** 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 
TMT wealth X  TMT 
wealth diversity 
 
0.152 
 
0.127 
 
0.197 ** 0.167 + 
TMT wealth X  TMT   
pay dispersion 
 
0.343 ** 0.338  ** -0.155 
 
-0.182 + 
TMT wealth X  TMT   
avg. % ownership 
 
 
 
-0.884 * 
  
-0.731 * 
Constant -3.069 *** -3.085 *** 1.225 *** 1.239 *** 
    Log-likelihood -339.66  -337.03  297.48  299.93  
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Wald χ2 -173.66 *** -177.65 *** 116.03 *** 121.23 *** 
χ 2 DF   24  25  21  23  
N 2193  2193  2199  2199  
 Year dummies are included in all specifications.    
   +p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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